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IT'S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW
IT (AND I FEEL FINE):1 RENT REGULATION IN
NEW YORK CITY AND THE UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS OF MARKET AND SOCIETY
Guy McPherson*
INTRODUCTION
Rent control has its flaws, but it does more good than harm. It
protects working-class people from the worst excesses of the
marketplace, and it assures that some middle-class people can still
afford to live in the city. It guarantees that New York won't become
a two-tiered society, affordable only to the very rich and, for those
lucky enough to live in government-subsidized housing, the very
poor.... No one has yet figured out a better way-short of massive
federal direct subsidies to tenants or nonprofit community
developers-to enable average New Yorkers to stay in the city.
2
"[R]ent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently
known to destroy a city-except for bombing," Swedish economist
Assar Lindbeck observed in a 1972 book. Rent control is a big cause
of [New York City's] financial mess, a huge cause of its notorious
housing scarcity and a neat illustration of its political unreality.
Ending it would be a big step toward unleashing a construction
boom and boosting [the city's] economy to offset destructive tax
increases.'
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Linda Sugin for sticking with me through the many paths this Note has
traveled, and for her invaluable guidance and suggestions. I would also like to thank
Professor Peter Siegelman for his assistance in the intimidating realm of economics. I
am deeply indebted to my parents and siblings, who have provided unwavering love
and support in my many endeavors. Finally, I would like to thank Shannon, for her
love, patience, and understanding through a process that must have seemed as if it
would never end. Go Heels.
1. R.E.M., It's the End of the World As We Know It (And I Feel Fine), on
Document (Capitol 1987).
2. Peter Dreier, The Landlords Stage a Rent Strike, The Nation, June 23, 1997, at
17.
3. Robert L. Bartely, Rent Control: New York's Self-Destruction, Wall St. J., May
19, 2003, at A17 (first alteration in original).
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For the more than one million rent-regulated apartments in New
York City,4 the salvos above are more than entertaining reading.
Instead, these comments are indicative of the debate that rages in
newspapers and academic publications, while successive state
legislative sessions in New York continue to engage in clandestine
lawmaking.5 At the end of the most recent rent regulation battle, the
New York state legislature gave the tenants and landlords of New
York City an eight-year extension of rent regulation laws.6 The
renewal essentially left the most contentious issues untouched, but
made a few changes.7  In what was categorized as "the most
potentially far reaching feature of the new legislation," the state
legislature "sharply limit[ed] the ability of the New York City Council
to alter rent regulation in the city."8 By prohibiting almost all action
by local government, the state legislature stifled the debate that would
naturally arise in conjunction with a local issue of such great
importance to city residents and their elected leaders.9 It is unlikely
that this foreclosing of local debate was an unintended side effect:
The eight-year extension is the longest such extension in the history of
the law, and with no possibility of debate at the city level, the status
quo will be preserved during that period."
During the next eight years, any discussion or debate revolving
around rent regulation will exist purely in theory, lacking the urgency
that a renewal deadline creates. 1 The next eight years, however,
might also be thought of as a reprieve that provides an opportunity for
4. New York City Rent Guidelines Board, Housing NYC: Rents, Markets and
Trends 2003, at 106-07 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Housing NYC]. As of the 2000 census,
there were just over one million rent stabilized units, and just under sixty thousand
rent controlled apartments in New York City. Id.
5. Elizabeth Kolbert, Accountants in the Sky: To Make Sense of Albany, You
Have to Turn Everything on Its Head, New Yorker, May 19, 2003, at 38 (describing
how the Governor and majority leaders of the House and Assembly have total control
over the lawmaking process). The article stated that "if a bill is of any significance it
is [the majority leaders] who determine, independently of the committees, whether or
not it will advance. The same is true once a bill gets to the floor. In Albany, except
under total-eclipse-of-the-sun-like circumstances, votes have only one possible
result." Id.
6. Warren A. Estis & Jeffrey Turkel, Eight-Year Extension: New Legislation
Renews Rent Laws Through 2011, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 2003, at 5.
7. Id. The changes in the law address the issues of so-called "preferential rents,"
high-rent deregulation, and state versus local regulatory power. Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 147-56.
8. Estis & Turkel, supra note 6.
9. The original law removing local power over rent control is known as the
Urstadt Law. 1971 N.Y. Laws 372. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
10. Clifford J. Levy, Experts See Initial Impact of Rent Law as Minimal, N.Y.
Times, June 22, 2003, at A27 ("The new law extends the rent regulations for eight
years, which is longer than previous [extensions] did.").
11. Id. ("Tenant groups described [the eight year extension] as a defeat, saying
that it is all but impossible to reopen the debate on the luxury-decontrol provisions in
the Legislature if the law is not about to expire.").
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debate. But debate is not an end in itself; particularly if, as in the past,
rent regulation debates ask-and attempt to answer-the wrong
questions. 12 The origin of this misplaced focus rests squarely on the
rent regulation laws themselves. The laws make arbitrary distinctions
between seemingly like-situated tenants, creating categories of haves
and have-nots in a system where the size of a building is more
important than the financial status of the tenant.13  In such an
environment, the debate revolves solely around the current laws-
regulation versus free market-and fails to ask the pivotal questions
of what society thinks a housing market should look like. 4 Currently,
rent regulation fuels a culture of "rental envy," where those outside
the system liken themselves to the victims of official corruption.15 In a
system like New York's, where need plays almost no part in
determining who receives the benefit of rent regulation, it is
understandable when those outside the system feel slighted.1 6
The arbitrary inequities created by the current system provide
abundant ammunition to those who oppose any government
regulation in the market. Noted housing economists present detailed
empirical data proving that the repeal of rent regulation would
12. For example, much of the anti-regulation literature makes very detailed
arguments about the inequities of the current regulatory system, but refuses to ask
whether potential outcomes in an unregulated market would be unacceptable to
society. See infra note 336.
13. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. Unconsol. Law §
8625(a)(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2004) (excepting from regulation housing
accommodations "in a building containing fewer than six dwelling units"); id. §
8625(a)(5) (excepting from regulation any housing accommodation "in buildings
completed or... substantially rehabilitated as family units on or after January first,
nineteen hundred seventy-four"); see infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
14. For example, society could debate the value of: economic diversity within a
community; protections against unilateral evictions; protection of certain classes of
tenants, such as the elderly, handicapped, and poor. The public debate almost never
addresses these points, but revolves around issues of equity and accuracy of focus.
When properly presented, questions of societal values should lead naturally to
questions of how much society is willing to pay, and who should bear the cost. The
question is not government regulation versus a free market. The question is whether
the current housing market provides what society values, and if it cannot, what can?
15. Letter to the Editor, Rent Control as an Urban Elixir, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
2004, at A18 (describing how a rent controlled tenant's well-to-do children can
unfairly inherit the apartment, while the landlord's children must pay exorbitant rents
to remain in Manhattan). It should be noted that the letter appears to be incorrect. If
the tenant's children do not live with the tenant for two continuous years, the laws do
not grant succession rights. See infra note 18.
16. The only income qualification under the current system occurs when an
apartment reaches the legal rent of $2,000. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 26-
403(e)(2)(j) (Supp. 2003) (applying to rent control), 26-504.1 (applying to rent
stabilization). If the rent surpasses this threshold, and the household income is in
excess of $175,000 per year for each of the two preceding calendar years, then the
apartment becomes deregulated. Id. §§ 26-403.1(c)(2), 26-504.3(c)(2). The laws
define income as "the federal adjusted gross income as reported on the New York
state income tax return." Id. §8 26-403.1(a), 26-504.3(a).
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increase investment in housing. 17 Yet, assuming that such an increase
in investment would actually occur, such studies fail to address the
question of whether increased housing investment furthers the goals
of society.18 One can hardly blame the opponents of government
regulation. Why would they address problems not addressed by the
law itself? It is much easier to portray the choice as all or nothing,
rent regulation versus a free market-this is exactly what proponents
of rent regulation do so effectively. 9
In opposition, proponents of rent regulation fight a losing battle.
They are attempting to protect rent laws that benefit a smaller and
smaller constituency, while opponents of regulation bombard those
outside the system with the message that rent regulations are a
giveaway to an undeserving few.2° The current rent regulation law
may not further the tenant advocates' self-proclaimed goals.21 It is
very difficult to defend a program that is rife with inequities. The fact
that the current program pits tenants against each other amplifies the
17. See, e.g., Henry 0. Pollakowski, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research,
Rent Control and Housing Investment: Evidence from Deregulation in Cambridge,
Massachusetts 5 (May 2003) [hereinafter Pollakowski, Cambridge].
18. Even otherwise liberal commentators fall into this trap. See Nicholas D.
Kristof, Editorial, Learning From China, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2003, at A23 (accepting
without question the conclusions of two studies commissioned by the libertarian (i.e.
anti-regulation) Manhattan Institute). The article argues that rents would fall after
deregulation, stating that "[i]f prices were freed, then retirees who spent most of their
time in Florida would give up their artificially cheap three-bedroom apartments, and
there would be a surge of both vacancies and new construction." Id. A reader of the
New York Times would assume two things from this argument. First, that rich tenants
may live in rent regulated apartments, and second, that tenants often maintain rent
regulated apartments as secondary dwellings. Both practices are specifically
forbidden by statute. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 26-403.1(c)(2) (1992) (allowing for
deregulation of apartments occupied by high income tenants), 26-403(e)(2)(h)(i)(10)
(exempting from rent control "[h]ousing accommodations not occupied by the
tenant ... as his or her primary residence"). Another common misconception is that
tenants may leave rent regulated apartments to their heirs, while still maintaining the
apartment's protected status. This is only true in limited circumstances to close family
members or those who can prove emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence with the tenant. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, §
2204.6(d)(3)(i) (2003). In either case, the succession rights are limited to those who
can prove that they have resided in the apartment as a primary residence for at least
two continuous years (one year for senior citizens or disabled persons). Id. §
2204.6(d)(1). While unlawful abuse of the regulations almost certainly occurs, it is
misleading when commentators attack laws as unfair while relying on examples that
clearly fall outside what the laws allow. See infra note 164.
19. See, e.g., Peter D. Salins & Gerard C.S. Mildner, Scarcity By Design: The
Legacy of New York City's Housing Policies 120-21 (1992) ("Only if we allow the
prices and rents of New York's housing stock to be set naturally by the market will
housing in New York be rationally, efficiently, and, for the first time in forty years,
fairly distributed.").
20. See generally Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake: George Pataki, Market
Ideology, and the Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 Fordham
Urb. L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that the New York media speaks with one
voice against rent regulations).
21. See supra text accompanying note 2.
2004] RENT REGULATION 1129
problem, because the arbitrary benefits of the law create arbitrary
divisions among tenants.2 The slow paring of protections occurring in
earnest since 199323 evidences the futility of clinging stubbornly to rent
regulations as they exist, particularly in a system that ignores the
neediest tenants.2 4
Already, opponents and proponents of rent regulation are
speculating how the next eight years will unfold. The tenant
advocates see the next eight years as a straightjacket on attempts to
roll back the systematic weakening of the law. 25 Their opponents
expect that in eight years, the declining number of tenants protected
under regulation will translate into a tenant movement too weak to
fight what they hope will be a total repeal of rent regulation in New
York. 6
In light of the important issues that will arise in the statutorily
imposed waiting period, this Note undertakes to illuminate issues that
traditionally have not received the appropriate level of attention.
Instead of relying on the traditional argument of government
regulation versus a free market, this Note frames the argument in
terms of societal values. Part I of this Note presents the existing
regulatory framework in an historical context. Then, in Part II, this
Note explains the arguments made for and against rent regulations in
22. For example, because the law does not apply to buildings with fewer than six
units, the laws could provide protection to a single tenant who makes $150,000 a year
and lives in a two-bedroom apartment costing less than $2,000 per month, while
denying benefits to a family of four living earning $35,000 per year living in a similarly
sized apartment on the same block.
23. In 1993, the state instituted measures that allowed for decontrol of vacant
units renting for more than $2,000, as well as occupied units where the household
income level exceeded $250,000 per year. See infra text accompanying note 119. In
1997, this high-income decontrol threshold was lowered to $175,000 per year,
landlords were granted large vacancy bonuses, and succession rights to family
members living in the apartment (but whose names were not on the lease) were
curtailed. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. In 2003, the law allowed owners
to rent increases not on the actual "preferential" rent (where an owner voluntarily
charges less than the legally allowable rent), but on what a landlord could have legally
charged. It also allowed total deregulation when this phantom rent reached the
$2,000 threshold, even though the landlord never actually charged $2,000 (and even if
the landlord never charges $2,000 in the future). See infra text accompanying notes
151-56.
24. In recent years, the media has been almost unanimous in its depiction of rent
regulations as protecting a privileged few, while needier tenants are left to pay for
undersupplied, overpriced apartments on the open market. Whether or not this
depiction is accurate, the perception is gaining strength. See Gurian, supra note 20
(manuscript at 11-12, on file with author). The article reports that in 1997, the
editorial boards of all the major New York newspapers were "unanimous in respect to
one thing: rent regulation had to go." Id. (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
25. David W. Chen, Bit by Bit, Government Eases Its Grip on Rents in New York,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2003, at BI (quoting a tenant advocate as saying that "the real
estate strategy is that when tenants come back in eight years, [we] will be smaller and
less powerful, and they will likely at that point say, 'Let it expire').
26. Id.
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light of a model simplifying rent regulation to a matching tax and
subsidy. Most importantly, this Note looks to several possible
underlying justifications for government regulation in the housing
market. After identifying goals that society might value, the Note
attempts to determine whether a free market regime is the only
equitable way of meeting such goals, or whether it is possible that
properly crafted government regulations might provide a more
desirable housing market. Part III concludes that truly productive
debate requires that the discourse shift away from the obvious
inequities among tenants under the current laws, and towards a goal-
oriented debate of societal values. Only when society identifies these
goals (such as economic diversity and eviction protections, to name
only two) can society ask the important questions: Will an
unregulated market achieve these goals? If regulations are required,
whom should they benefit and who should pay?
Finally, this Note proposes that a rent regulation system akin to the
New York City's Senior Citizens Rent Increase Exemption program
("SCRIE")27 would better serve society in reaching certain objectives,
and suggests that an expansion of SCRIE could achieve the goal of
protecting the neediest tenants while removing disincentives towards
real estate investment.
I. NEW YORK CITY'S RENT REGULATION SYSTEM
2s
Rent regulation 29 in New York City is a complicated mix of state
and local laws.3 °  Before commencing with an analysis of rent
regulations, it is helpful to know just how New York's current rent
regulation regime came about. At one time or another, New York
City has been subject to rent regulations enacted from the federal,
state, and municipal governments.31 Understanding the history of
these interactions provides important insight into the current debate.
27. New York State enables the city to promulgate SCRIE. N.Y. Real. Prop. Tax
Law § 467-b (McKinney Supp. 2004). The substantive and procedural provisions are
codified in the city's administrative code. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-509 (1992 &
Supp. 2003).
28. New York City serves as the focus of this Note. However, there are many
other municipalities in the United States and abroad that employ some form of rent
regulation. However, much of the literature focuses on the experience in New York,
providing a source of research far richer than would be available for other locations.
29. Many commentators refer to rent regulations generically as "rent control." As
discussed below, in New York, rent control is a term of art, referring only to a specific
class of rental units. In fact, most rent regulated units in New York fall under rent
stabilization, which also describes a specific class of rental units. To avoid confusion,
this Note will refer generically to rent regulation, and specifically to either rent
control or stabilization.
30. See infra Part I.B. for a detailed analysis of the present interaction between
state and local rent laws.
31. See infra Part I.A.2. (federal); Part I.A.1., 4.-40. (state); Part I.A.3.
(municipal).
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A. The History of Rent Regulation
While the rent regulations currently in force have a direct lineage to
the federal rent laws of the Second World War,32 New York's first
attempt at rent regulation actually occurred in the 1920s.33 This early
phase of rent regulation-while lacking a direct provenance-
provides insight into early attempts at answering questions of equity
and incentive that continue to arise, and yields surprising empirical
data relating to rent regulations and housing construction.34
1. The 1920s: New York's First Attempt at Rent Regulation
Rent regulation in New York City has roots as early as 1920,35 when
the fear of communism was a powerful influence on politics. 3 6 During
this time, legislation was enacted that allowed tenants "to legally
challenge 'unjust, unreasonable and oppressive' rent hikes."37 These
laws, known as the April Laws,38 placed the burden of proof on the
tenant when the rent hike was 25 percent or less.39 In practice, this
requirement turned out to be an impossible burden, and as one judge
noted: "'I do not know of a single tenant who has been able to
establish that the 25 percent was unreasonable. You see, the figures
are all in the possession of the landlord and it is impossible."'4
32. See infra Part I.A.2.
33. See infra Part I.A.1.
34. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
35. See Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 52-53.
36. W. Dennis Keating, Rent Regulation in New York City: A Protracted Saga, in
Rent Control: Regulation and the Housing Market 151, 152 (W. Dennis Keating et al.
eds., 1998) (stating that rent regulations first appeared during "the politically charged
atmosphere of the post-World War I 'Red Scare"'); see also Joseph A. Spencer, New
York City Tenant Organizations and the Post-World War I Housing Crisis, in The
Tenant Movement in New York City, 1904-1984, at 51, 64 (Ronald Lawson ed., 1986)
(reciting one judge's assessment of aggressive landlord evictions as "causing serious
distress, which made tenants 'easy prey for agitators who are Bolsheviks and other
forms of radicals"').
37. Robin Reisig, Rent Regulation, Gotham Gazette, Mar. 9, 2003, available at
www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20030309/200/305. The law provided
that municipal judges could grant stays of eviction, extended written leases without
specific durations until October 1, 1920, and made it the landlord's burden to show
the court that a tenant was "'objectionable' when such charges were made as the
grounds for summary eviction." Spencer, supra note 36, at 72; see also Keating, supra
note 36, at 152 ("For the first time, tenants gained the right to defend themselves in
court, based upon the presumption that a rent increase of 25 percent or more was
,unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive."'); see also September Jarrett, Rent Regulation
in New York City: A Briefing Book, app. B (1993), available at
http://tenant.net/Oversight/Briefing/appendb.html ("[T]enants could go to court to
challenge rent increases as excessive.").
38. Spencer, supra note 36, at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73; see Keating, supra note 36, at 152 (noting that the April Rent Laws
moved the "administrative responsibility [to] the hands of the state judicial system
rather than the city of New York").
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Landlords easily exploited this loophole by refraining from any rent
increase in excess of twenty-five percent.
41
But the April Laws contained an even more serious defect, in that
all
written leases of unspecified duration would expire on October 1.
Landlords were under no obligation to renew these leases, and
therefore began notifying such tenants months in advance to move
on September 30-since new tenants were not covered by the rent
laws and could be charged much higher rents. The city faced the
prospect of sixty thousand evictions from this provision alone.42
On September 27, 1920, just three days before mass evictions
threatened chaos, the state legislature passed the Emergency Rent
Laws.43 Most importantly, the Emergency Laws quelled fears of mass
eviction by making it extremely difficult for landlords to refuse to
renew leases that expired on October 1.4 The law also did away with
the 25 percent requirement, gave judges discretion in determining the
reasonableness of rent increases, and placed the burden of proof on
the landlord to show that the rent increase was reasonable.45 These
changes made large rent increases and evictions more difficult to
achieve, and some tenant groups went so far as to declare victory.4 6
The years following the enactment of the Emergency Rent Laws
witnessed a remarkable occurrence: apartment construction in New
York City skyrocketed, with the number of new buildings reaching
over 4,600 in 1927, compared with only 95 in 1919. 47 By as early as
1927, this increase in housing supply caused the vacancy rate to rise
above 5 percent, a rate generally considered necessary for a healthy
rental housing market.48  Under these changing conditions, the
41. Spencer, supra note 36, at 72-73. The setting of the twenty-five percent or
lower figure resulted in a situation where "[t]housands [of tenants] received demands
for 25 percent increases." Id. at 73.
42. Id. (internal citation omitted). Even judges spoke out, warning of "thousands
of stays of eviction which would soon come due, thousands of tenants denied lease
renewals, and ever-increasing court calendars." Id. at 74.
43. 1920 N.Y. Laws 942-44; see Keating, supra note 36, at 152 (noting that a "glut
of [eviction] cases, in fact, was one of the factors that led to the passage of the
Emergency Rent Laws"); Spencer, supra note 36, at 75.
44. Spencer, supra note 36, at 75.
45. Id. The law required landlords to submit to judges "a bill of particulars setting
forth figures as to gross income and expenses," and restricted the ability of landlords
to deny renewal to those leases set to expire on October I under the April Rent Laws.
Id.
46. Id. at 75-76 (noting that "several thousand members of [a tenant group] held a
victory parade in which they carried signs reading No More Moving and Victory Is
Ours").
47. Id. at 83 tbl.2.1. This gain in apartment buildings translated into an increase in
1927 of almost 80,000 individual units, compared to just over 1,600 in 1919. Id.
48. Id. at 83. In 1920, the year the Emergency Rent Laws passed, the vacancy rate
stood at a minuscule .36 percent. Id. at 84 tbl.2.2. The 1920s saw vacancy rates as low
as .15 percent in 1921, before rising steadily to 7.76 percent in 1928. Id. But see Salins
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legislature slowly weakened the Emergency Rent Laws, finally
allowing them to expire in 1928-29. 4" At this time, there was an
unofficial consensus that the housing emergency had ended." After a
failed attempt by the New York City Board of Aldermen to institute
local rent control, in the "fall of 1929, for the first time in nearly a
decade, New York City tenants were without rent control."51 New
York's first attempt at rent regulations lasted only nine years. It is
unlikely that after more than a decade of unregulated rents, anyone
would have expected the next phase of rent regulation to come not
from City Hall or Albany, but from Washington D.C.
2. World War II and Beyond: 1942-1961
The federal government passed the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942 ("EPCA") as an attempt to prevent wartime profiteering in
many important sectors, including "defense area housing."52
Administration of the EPCA fell to the Price Administrator within
the Office of Price Administration ("OPA").53  The Price
Administrator could, "by regulation or order establish such maximum
price ... as in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and
will effectuate the purposes of [the EPCA]. 54  Initially, the OPA
& Mildner, supra note 19, at 56 (attributing the increasing vacancy rates on the phase-
out of controls).
49. Spencer, supra note 36, at 80-86. The legislature annually renewed the laws
without significant opposition through February 1926. Id. at 80-81. The 1926 renewal
contained the first weakening of the laws, as it exempted all apartments renting for
more than twenty dollars per room per month. Id. at 82. This trend continued the
following year, with the 1927 extension "limited to existing tenancies in apartments
renting at less than fifteen dollars per room per month." Id. at 85. In March of 1928,
political wrangling between Governor Smith and the state legislature forced the
governor to sign a final extension of the rent laws against the recommendation of his
own State Board of Housing. Id. at 85-86. This extension continued "controls on
apartments renting for fifteen dollars per room until December 31, 1928, and controls
on apartments renting for less than ten dollars or less until June 15, 1929." Id.
50. Id. at 86 ("[Mlost observers acknowledged, even if indirectly, that the postwar
crisis was over.").
51. Id.; see also Keating, supra note 36, at 152 ("As the Great Depression began,
rent control ended in New York City."); Jarrett, supra note 37 (stating that "[t]he first
wave of rent regulation was brief in tenure; it was completely phased out by 1929").
52. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947); see
New York Div. of Housing and Community Renewal, Rent Regulation After 50
Years: An Overview of New York State's Rent Regulated Housing 3 (1993)
[hereinafter Rent Regulation After 50] ("President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into
law the [EPCA] which provided for a universal, nationwide price regulatory
system."); Joel Schwartz, Tenant Power in the Liberal City, 1943-1971, in The Tenant
Movement in New York City, 1904-1984, at 134, 137 (Ronald Lawson ed., 1986);
Jarrett, supra note 37 (stating that "rent regulation resurfaced as a federal initiative").
53. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 201(a), 56 Stat. 23, 29.
54. Id. § 2(a). Section 2(b) refers to the "stabilization or reduction of rents for any
defense-area housing accommodations within a particular defense-rental area."
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refused to institute a rent ceiling in New York City.5 Increasing civil
unrest and political pressure forced the OPA to act. On November 1,
1943, the OPA froze New York City rents retroactively to their March
1, 1943 levels.56
After the war, political wrangling between President Truman and
congressional Republicans resulted in extensions of federal rent
regulations.57 As early as 1944, Congress made clear that a transition
out of federal price controls was the ultimate goal.5 In 1946, Congress
amended the EPCA, declaring a policy to terminate controls as
quickly as possible, but "in no event later than June 30, 1947." 51 In
1947, Congress allowed the EPCA to expire, replacing it with the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947 ("1947 Act"). 6° The 1947 Act lifted
controls on all housing built after February 1, 1947, while continuing
to extend controls on existing housing. 61 Congress granted the states
the power to administer these controls, and New York passed the
Emergency Housing Rent Law ("EHRL"), creating the State Housing
Commission to temporarily administer rent control at the state level. 62
As the post-war shortages continued to lessen, Congress passed
legislation in 1949 allowing individual states to terminate federal rent
control when they could prove either that they had a suitable state
system in place, or that the housing emergency necessitating rent
control no longer existed.63 Congress extended this provision until
55. Keating, supra note 36, at 154 (stating that the OPA believed "the city's rental
vacancy rate was too high to justify rent control").
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch. 671, 60 Stat. 664. This final
extension to the EPCA stated strongly that the ultimate goal of the extensions was to
create a smooth transition to total decontrol. Id. § 1A(a)(1) (stating the goal as
"making possible a successful transition to a peacetime economy of maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power under a system of free enterprise").
58. Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, ch. 325, 58 Stat. 632, § 2(b). While it is
clear from the 1944 Act that price gouging and inflation were still a concern, Congress
for the first time allowed for previously controlled defense area housing to be
decontrolled where an emergency is no longer found to exist. Id.
59. Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch. 671, 60 Stat. 664, § 1A(b).
60. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat. 193. The statute declares that
its purpose is to "terminate at the earliest practicable date all Federal restrictions on
rents on housing accommodations." Id. § 201(b).
61. Id. § 202(c)(3)(A). In New York, February 1, 1947 remains the critical date in
determining eligibility of a rental unit for rent control. The 1947 Act also contained
additional changes. See Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 3; Keating, supra
note 36, at 154 (noting that the 1947 Act weakened federal controls "by allowing 15
percent rent increases for vacated apartments and, when tenants voluntarily agreed,
authorizing landlord hardship rent increases, exempting new construction, and ending
OPA review of evictions"); Schwartz, supra note 52, at 141-43.
62. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8583 (McKinney Supp. 2004); see also Keating, supra
note 36, at 154.
63. Housing and Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, 63 Stat. 18, § 2040)(1)-(2); see also Rent
Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 3 (noting that the 1949 legislation gave the
states the "authority to assume administrative control of rent regulation and the
power to continue, eliminate or modify the Federal System").
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1953, when, in its final extension of federal rent control legislation, it
set July 1, 1953 as a deadline allowing local governments to pass their
own laws extending rent controls.64
Most municipalities in the country allowed the federal controls to
expire without extending the regulations locally. In 1961, New York
City stood alone as the only location in the country continuing to
maintain a rent control regime.66 Even those major cities that did
extend controls did so only temporarily. New York State, however,
maintained its state system of rent control under the EHRC.67 This
state rent control was similar to the federal counterpart, as it applied
to all buildings built before February 1, 1947.68 A base date of March
1, 1950 was set, and all rent increases were barred for a period of six
months.69  This system remained in force for more than a decade,
during which time moderate but steady decontrols allowed for
increases in rents while exempting additional classes of housing
accommodation. °
3. Local Controls and Rent Stabilization: 1962-1970
After more than a decade of moderate decontrols, the next major
chapter in the history of rent regulation occurred in the 1960s.71 In
1962, the State Legislature ended state rent control, while granting
New York City the power to enact local rent regulations.72 New York
City promptly passed the Local Emergency Housing Rent Control
Act,73 which continued Rent Control under the administration of the
local housing agency.74 The most important local action came in 1969,
when New York City enacted the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969
("RSL"). 75 The RSL created the system of Rent Stabilization, and for
64. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 57.
65. Id. at 57-58 (noting that eight major cities allowed their rent control extensions
to expire in the period between 1953 and 1961); see also Keating, supra note 36, at
154.
66. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 58. Salins and Mildner also note that New
York City remained the only place in the country with rent control until "the great
inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s." Id.
67. Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8582(2)(g); see
also Reisig, supra note 37.
68. Jarrett, supra note 37; Reisig, supra note 37.
69. Keating, supra note 36, at 154.
70. This occurred through a combination of decontrol measures that included
removing vacant units in one and two-family houses after April 1, 1953, and removing
units that were considered "luxury" units in 1958. Rent Regulation After 50, supra
note 52, at 4; see also Keating, supra note 36, at 155.
71. The total number of rent controlled units had dropped from 2.5 million in
1950 to 1.8 million in 1961. Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 3-4.
72. Jarrett, supra note 37.
73. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8601-8617 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004).
74. Jarrett, supra note 37. In 1962, this law applied to over 1.8 million apartments
in New York City. Id.
75. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-501 to 26-520 (1992).
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the first time included buildings constructed after February 1, 1947.76
Unlike rent control, rent stabilization uses leases rather than statutes
to regulate rents.77
In order for leases to effectively regulate rents, the RSL required
landlords to grant tenants renewal leases, and tenants were "obligated
to renew if they want[ed] to remain in occupancy. '7 Designed to be
less onerous to landlords, rent stabilization also provided for an
automatic means of adjusting rents.79  It also created the Rent
Guidelines Board ("RGB"), which had the power to set rent increases
to be applied to any lease renewed during the following year. 0 To
determine the rent increases for renewal leases, the RGB relies on the
Price Index of Operating Costs ("PIOC"). s1 The PIOC uses a
complicated formula that measures the annual changes in operating
costs. s2 The RGB also determines a "'core' PIOC," which attempts to
measure "long-term inflationary trends" by excluding "the erratic
changes in fuel oil, natural gas and electricity costs."83
Neither the PIOC nor the core PIOC is the absolute determination
of rent increase amounts. The PIOC numbers instead inform another
formula, the Commensurate Rent Adjustment ("CRA"), which
includes not only operating costs, but also revenues and inflation.'
This formula combines these factors "into a single measure indicating
how much rents would have to change for net operating income
(NOI)... to remain constant. 8 ' There is considerable debate over
how to calculate the commensurate rent adjustment, so much so that
the RGB included three different methodologies in its 2003 PIOC
report.8 6 Not surprisingly, this lack of internal consensus results in the
76. Reisig, supra note 37. Rent Stabilization applied to approximately 400,000
units that had been previously exempt from Rent Control. Jarrett, supra note 37.
77. 74A N.Y. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 413 (1999).
78. Jarrett, supra note 37. The ETPA allowed the tenant the choice of one-, two-,
and three-year renewal leases. Id.
79. Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 5.
80. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-510. In New York City, there are nine members on
the RGB, all appointed by the mayor. Jarrett, supra note 37. Two members represent
the tenant's interests, two represent landlord's interests, and five members represent
the general public. Id.
81. 2003 Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 11-20.
82. See id. at 11-12. The PIOC measures annual changes in the cost of taxes,
labor, fuel, utilities, contractor services, administration, insurance, parts and supplies,
and equipment replacement. Id. at 12. Each of these categories is broken down into
subcategories, each weighted to reflect the category's importance. Id. at 91.
Additionally, there is a different weighting system for buildings built before and after
1947, one example being that fuel costs are given more weight in pre-1947 buildings.
Id. at 12, 96.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 20-21.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id. at 20-21. The methodologies are: 1) net revenue formula; 2) CPI-adjusted
NOI formula; 3) traditional formula. As the report states:
All of these methods have their limitations. The "traditional" commensurate
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RGB declaring that "[e]ach of these formulae may be best thought of
as a starting point for deliberations. The other [RGB Research] and
testimony to the Board can be used to modify the various estimates
depending on these other considerations."87 In fact, the one- and two-
year renewal lease rent increases do not resemble the various
commensurate rent adjustment figures released by the RGB.88
4. Vacancy Decontrol and Urstadt: 1971-73
The 1970s brought a period of upheaval and uncertainty in New
York City's rent regulation regime. In 1971, the State Legislature
passed laws that phased out all rent regulations statewide.89 The law
established vacancy decontrol of all units under rent control or rent
stabilization.9 By the end of 1973, 300,000 rent controlled units and
approximately 88,000 rent stabilized units were deregulated.9'
In addition, the legislature passed the "Urstadt Law."9 At the time,
the threat of complete deregulation overshadowed the passage of the
Urstadt Law, but its lasting implications soon became apparent.93 The
Urstadt Law forbids any municipality in New York from enacting rent
regulations more stringent than those passed by the State
formula is artificial and does not consider the impact of lease terms or
inflation on landlords' income. The "Net Revenue" formula does not
attempt to adjust NOI based on changes in interest rates or deflation of
landlord profits. The "CPI-Adjusted NOI" formula inflates the debt service
portion of NOI, even though interest rates have been generally falling,
rather than rising over recent years.
Id. at 21. Also, the adjustment for estimated vacancy increase "assumes both that
vacancy increases are charged and collected, and that turnover rates are constant
across the City." Id. Finally, "the traditional method differs from the other formulas
in that it uses both the PIOC's actual change in costs as well as the PROJECTED
change in costs... which may not end up being an accurate estimate of owner's
costs." Id.
87. Id. at 22.
88. For example, the RGB's final adjustment for one- and two-year leases was
5.5% and 8.5% respectively. Robert Ingrassia, Landlords Win Big Raise: Lease Leaps,
Within Bounds, Daily News (New York), May 6, 2003, at 2 (listing the final one- and
two-year rent adjustments for the previous twenty years). The five formulae
calculated by the RGB yield very different percentages: traditional: 10.4%, 12.6%; net
revenue: 15%, 20%; net revenue with vacancy adjustment: 12%, 16%; CPI-adjusted
NOI: 16%, 23%; CPI-adjusted NOI with vacancy adjustment: 13.5%, 18%. 2003
Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 21. In 2002, the tables were turned, as the RGB's final
adjustment for one- and two-year leases was 2% and 4% respectively, while each of
the formulae yielded negative or zero percentage increases. Ingrassia, supra; N.Y.
City Rent Guidelines Board, Housing NYC: Rents, Markets and Trends 2002, at 22
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 Housing NYC].
89. 1971 N.Y. Laws 371; see also Jarrett, supra note 37.
90. Jarrett, supra note 37.
91. Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 6.
92. 1971 N.Y. Laws 372; see also Jarrett, supra note 37.
93. Rebecca Webber, The Urstadt Law: How Albany Controls NYC Rents,
Gotham Gazette, July 2002, available at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/housing/jul.02.shtml.
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Legislature.94 Hence, after the passage of the Urstadt Law, New York
City can only weaken state rent regulation laws, not strengthen
them. 5 The Urstadt Law effectively shifted New York City's power
to regulate its own rental housing to Albany.9 6
5. The Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974
Inflationary pressures caused rents in New York City to increase
dramatically in the year following vacancy decontrol.97 In response,
Governor Nelson Rockefeller created the Temporary State
Commission on Living Costs and the Economy of the State of New
York, and charged the commission to research and make
recommendations on the future of vacancy decontrol.98 After finding
that vacancy decontrol caused dramatic increases in rents, the
Commission recommended the retroactive repeal of vacancy
decontrol. 99 This finding overlapped with the increased ability of the
tenant's movement to lobby at a statewide level, as required by the
Urstadt Law."°  Additionally, the resignation of Governor
Rockefeller in 1973 changed the political landscape. Rockefeller's
replacement, Governor Malcolm Wilson, was "relatively unknown,
[and] had to face the voters a year later."'' Governor Wilson's office
worked secretly with the New York State Tenant's Legislative
Coalition ("NYSTLC") towards an agreement to strengthen rent
94. 1971 N.Y. Laws 372. The passage of this law followed the successful
modification of the local Rent Control Law in 1970. The modification created a
Minimum Base Rent ("MBR") formula that set an "economic rent" for the over 1.3
million units then under Rent Control. Ronald Lawson & Reuben B. Johnson III,
Tenant Responses to the Urban Housing Crisis, 1970-1984, in The Tenant Movement
in New York City, 1904-1984, at 209, 211 (Ronald Lawson ed., 1986). The MBR was
phased in, with an initial 15 percent increase, and subsequent 7.5 percent increases
until the rent equaled the MBR. Before the city, under Mayor John V. Lindsay could
even implement the MBR, however, "Reform Democrat political clubs began a
campaign to ... [add an] MBR repeal referendum.., to the election ballot." Id. at
212-13. Apparently the mere threat of repeal sent the real estate lobby to Albany in
1971, where Governor Nelson Rockefeller argued successfully for both vacancy
decontrol and the abrogation of home rule provisions relating to rent regulations.
Governor Rockefeller relied on the argument that "no New York City administration
could ever administer rent control fairly or implement modifications in the law
because 'irresponsible' politicians and the huge bloc of tenant votes would eventually
combine to repeal any changes." Id. at 213.
95. This restriction even applies to those laws that only apply to New York City,
either explicitly or implicitly. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 372.
96. Webber, supra note 93.
97. Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id. The Committee found "that vacancy decontrol resulted in average rent
increases of 52% in decontrolled apartments and 19% in previously stabilized units in
New York City, while operating costs increased by 7.9%." Id.
100. Lawson & Johnson, supra note 94, at 218-20.
101. Id. at 218.
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regulations. °2 The secret soon leaked, and "when the agreement was
revealed to the leaders of the state senate and assembly, they revolted
and it unraveled."' 3 The State Legislature ultimately responded with
a compromise law: the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974
("ETPA"). °4 The EPTA allowed municipalities to declare a housing
emergency where vacancy rates were less than five percent. 105 In New
York City, units that had never been under rent regulation came
under the Rent Stabilization system, and stabilized units that had
deregulated under the 1971 law were re-regulated. 106
6. The Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption
In 1972, the state legislature passed legislation enabling local
governments to provide rent increase exemptions for low-income
elderly and disabled tenants of rent regulated housing. 7 New York
City enacted local ordinances applying to elderly tenants who resided
in rent controlled0 8 and rent stabilized0 9 apartments."0 Qualifying
tenants must be sixty-two years or older, have a household income not
exceeding $24,000 per year, and must be paying one-third or more of
their annual income in rent.' Owners of rental property where
tenants receive a rent increase exemption receive property tax
abatements equal to the rent they cannot collect from the tenant.12 In
this way, the legislature has determined that society as a whole, not
individual owners, should bear the cost of protecting low-income
elderly tenants.
7. Return to State Administration: 1983 Omnibus Housing Act
In 1983, another significant change in the rental housing laws
occurred. The 1983 Omnibus Housing Act 13 amended the ETPA,
removing local administration of all rent regulation to a single state
102. Id. at 219.
103. Id.
104. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8621-8634 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
105. Id. § 8623(a).
106. Jarrett, supra note 37. Those units previously under Rent Control were not
affected; they were either decontrolled or converted to rent stabilization when they
became vacant.
107. 1972 N.Y. Laws 689 (codified as N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 467-b (McKinney
Supp. 2004)).
108. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-405(m) (1992 & Supp. 2003).
109. Id. § 26-509(b).
110. For a discussion on how the SCRIE program could be expanded, see infra
Part III.
111. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 26-405(m)(2)(i)-(ii) (1992), 26-509(b)(2)(i)-(ii). New
York City Local Law 67 of 2003 raised the income level to $24,000. The amount of
the exemption is an amount that will reduce the rent payment to one-third of the
tenant's income. Id. §§ 26-405(m)(9), 26-509(b)(9).
112. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 467-b(2).
113. 1983 N.Y. Laws 403.
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agency, the New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal ("DHCR").114 This effectively removed all power regarding
rent regulations from New York City. The Omnibus Housing Act
required that all rent stabilized apartments be registered with the
DHCR, which eliminated the existing self-policing mechanism that
landlords had applied.115
8. Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993
The Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993116 is important primarily
because it instituted luxury decontrol.11 7 Luxury decontrol under this
law has two components. First, if a unit had a legal rent of more than
$2,000 per month, when that unit became vacant, it would become
deregulated upon application by the landlord."8 Second, even if the
unit is not vacant and the rent reaches $2,000 per month, if the
tenant's "combined household income [exceeded] $250,000 in each of
the two immediately preceding years," the apartment is deregulated
upon application by the landlord.1 19
9. Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997
The most recent major legislative battle over rent regulation laws
occurred in 1997.12 With the laws supporting rent regulations due to
expire on June 15, 1997, the first shot had been fired across the bow as
early as December 1996 by State Senator Joseph Bruno, the Senate
Majority Leader. 121 In an address to a group of powerful property
owners, Senator Bruno called for the complete abolition of rent
regulation in New York State. 22  Senator Bruno's statement
"transformed an insider's game-fought with campaign contributions,
backroom lobbying and arcane legislative maneuvers-into a media
114. Id. The Omnibus Housing Act abolished the New York City Division of Rent
Control, and required all landlords to register the effective rents each year with the
DHCR. In addition, the law removed the option of a three-year lease, and provided
that the RGB could not adjust rents more than once a year. It also provided a
hardship application process for rent stabilized tenants. Rent Regulation After 50,
supra note 52, at 7-8.
115. Keating, supra note 36, at 162.
116. 1993 N.Y. Laws 253.
117. Id. § 6; Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 8.
118. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-504.2(a) (Supp. 2003).
119. Rent Regulation After 50, supra note 52, at 8; see also N.Y.C. Admin. Code §
26-504.1 (amended by 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, §14 to reduce the income threshold from
$250,000 to $175,000).
120. While the 2003 renewal was fraught with delay and uncertainty, it ultimately
turned out to be insignificant in scope when compared to the 1997 reform. Cf infra
notes 131-56 and accompanying text.
121. James Dao & Richard P6rez-Pefia, Rent War Redux: As Dust Settles, A
Tortuous Inside Story Emerges, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1997, § 1, at 1.
122. Id.
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spectacle, a holy war.', 123 This "holy war" was waged early and hard.
By as early as April of 1997, the tenant's lobby, under the State
Democratic Party, had produced television commercials that accused
Republicans Pataki and D'Amato "of being the real culprits behind
the rent fight.' 1 24 In the end, the intense pressure that was sparked by
Senator Bruno's comments resulted in a deal between Democratic
Majority Leader Sheldon Silver of the State Assembly and Governor
Pataki, resulting in the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997 ("1997
Act"). 125
The 1997 Act reduced the income vacancy threshold from $250,000
to $175,000, and reduced the class of immediate family eligible for
succession rights. 26 Most importantly, the 1997 Act allows owners to
collect a sizable "vacancy bonus.' 1 27 In addition, the 1997 Act allowed
landlords special increases for low rent apartments. 28 These rent
increases drastically decrease the amount of time required to achieve
the $2,000 vacancy decontrol threshold. 29
The slow decay of regulations continued in December of 2000,
when the DHCR amended the Rent Stabilization Code. The changes
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. While many reports had Senator Bruno seething at the compromise bill, a
later report alleged that he intentionally took "a radical position to frighten tenants
and Democrats into accepting vacancy decontrol-which the Governor would
propose as a compromise just before the June 15 deadline." Id. The report also
quoted Senator Bruno as saying "I knew I had to go as far to the right as I could to
get [Speaker Silver] to vacancy decontrol .... Vacancy decontrol was always the
bottom line." Id. Whether or not this is true, or an after-the-fact ploy to save face is
beside the point. This statement validates the cries of the tenant lobby that came
shortly after the law passed that this law "chipped away a lot," and that the 1997 law
was "better than what we were faced with, which is vacancy decontrol." Merle
English, Tenants Groups Split Over Rent Deal, Newsday (New York), June 17, 1997,
at A25. It is important to note that in this context "vacancy decontrol" refers to a
situation where all apartments would be deregulated immediately upon vacancy. The
"vacancy decontrol" actually passed in the law is more appropriately termed, "high
rent vacancy decontrol," because the rent must be $2,000 per month before decontrol
may occur. See, e.g., 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, §§ 7, 7-a, 12, 15; see infra text accompanying
notes 184-85.
126. See, e.g., 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 21 (change to eligible family members), §§ 7-b,
8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16 (lowering of income threshold to $175,000).
127. Id. § 19; see Warren A. Estis & Jeffrey Turkel, The New York Rent
Regulation Reform Act of 1997 § 2.03 (1997) (displaying how the new law could
result in rent increases of as much as 42.8%).
128. 1997 N.Y. Laws 116, § 19. This provision amended the Rent Stabilization Law
of 1969, adding § 26-511(5-a) to the administrative code. Id. For apartments renting
for less than $300 per month, the amendment grants an additional $100 increase to the
rent to the standard vacancy bonus. Id. For apartments renting between $300 and
$500 per month, the standard vacancy bonus is augmented to grant a total vacancy
bonus of $100. Id.; see also Estis & Turkel, supra note 127, § 2.04.
129. See Josh Barbanel, As Rents Rise, So Does Deregulation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
2003, § 11, at 1.
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gave landlords new powers of eviction and increased methods of
raising the rent on vacant units.130
10. 2003 Rent Law Extensions
June 15, 2003, the expiration date for the rent laws, loomed, but
there was no repeat of the months of fierce public debate that
accompanied the 1997 Act. When the renewal of the rent laws finally
came to the fore in early June, the two sides rallied around the issue of
vacancy decontrol.'3 ' Proponents of rent regulation ultimately wanted
the repeal of vacancy decontrol tied to a rent threshold of $2,000, but
had at least hoped for an increase in the rental amount triggering the
vacancy decontrol.132
Opponents of rent regulation felt that 2003 was "as good a time as
ever to advocate the eventual phasing out of New York's 60-year-old
rent regulation system, given the Republican hold over both the
Senate and the governor's mansion.""'13 In the alternative, opponents
argued for a lowering of the vacancy decontrol threshold,3 and a
lowering of the high-income decontrol threshold from the current
$175,000 income level." 5
Before this backdrop, the two sides failed to reach a compromise as
the June 15th deadline approached. 36 In fact, the deadline came and
passed, with the legislature passing emergency one-day extensions of
the rent laws for four consecutive days. 3 7 As the final deadline passed
at midnight of June 19th, the State Senate "introduced and passed a
130. See Reisig, supra note 37.
131. David W. Chen & Winnie Hu, Extension of Rent Laws Finds Support, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 2003, at Bi.
132. See Winnie Hu & David W. Chen, Albany Extends Landlord Power over Rent
Curbs, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2003, at Al ("Lobbyists for the tenants' groups... had
wanted the repeal of high-rent vacancy decontrol. .. ."); Winnie Hu, Rent Laws
Extended Again, in Albany Standoff, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2003, at B3 ("In search of a
compromise, legislators and advocates in both chambers have proposed several
alternatives to an outright repeal of vacancy decontrol, such as increasing the
threshold to $2,500.").
133. Chen & Hu, supra note 131.
134. Hu, supra note 132 ("[In opposition to increasing the vacancy decontrol
threshold], opponents of rent regulations have proposed lowering the threshold to
$1,500.").
135. Chen & Hu, supra note 131 (stating that "many landlords would like to see
both [vacancy decontrol and high-income thresholds] lowered" arguing that "[i]t's
hard to understand how the Assembly thinks people who make $150,000 a year are
rich enough to pay higher income taxes, but needy enough to deserve rent control"
(quotation omitted)).
136. Id. (hypothesizing that "Albany, having already squeezed out a difficult
budget, may not have the political stomach to do more than just extend the current
laws without any alterations").
137. 2003 N.Y. Laws 70 (extending to midnight, June 16th); 2003 N.Y. Laws 71
(extending to midnight, June 17th); 2003 N.Y. Laws 72 (extending to midnight, June
18th); 2003 N.Y. Laws 73 (extending to midnight, June 19th).
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bill to extend the rent laws shortly after they expired just after
midnight., 138 This last-minute "surprise move" introduced a bill that
one Democratic senator called "a 'declaration of nuclear war on rent-
regulated tenants in New York.""39 Hyperbole aside, the Senate bill
granted none of the concessions that tenant groups wanted, provided
landlords with increased power of deregulation, 140 and "sharply
limit[ed] the ability of the New York City Council to alter rent
regulation in the city.' 141 With the passage of this bill, "the Senate
Republicans hastily dispatched it to the Assembly and filed out at
daybreak to adjourn for the summer. [Senate Majority Leader]
Bruno, who had vowed to end the legislative session on Thursday, said
he was done talking and would not revisit the issue. "142 One might
guess that such a threat must be empty, that there is some procedure
in place to resolve conflicting bills. As with many other aspects of the
New York legislative process, common sense is a poor guide. 43 With
no official procedure in place to force the two houses to the
bargaining table:
Assembly Democrats were left with a difficult choice. They could
accept a bill that could deregulate thousands of apartments whose
rents creep up beyond the $2,000 mark-more than 300,000
apartments over the next decade, according to estimates by tenant
organizers. Or they could allow the rent law, which technically
expired at 12:01 a.m. [June 20th], to fade away entirely.1"
Faced with such choices, the Assembly blinked first and passed the
Senate bill almost twenty hours after the existing laws had expired.145
Democratic legislators, unwilling to call Senator Bruno's bluff, refused
to gamble that they could force the Republican leadership back to the
table. 46
The resulting extension of the rent laws lasts eight years and makes
changes described as "minimal." '147 As described above, the "most
potentially far reaching feature of the new legislation" is the strict
138. Hu & Chen, supra note 132.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Estis & Turkel, supra note 6.
142. Hu & Chen, supra note 132.
143. Id. ("[T]he New York Legislature does not have a procedure to resolve
conflicting bills passed by the two chambers .....
144. Id.
145. Id. ("The Assembly Democrats ... passed the Senate bill shortly before 8 p.m.
by a vote of 106 to 38.").
146. Id. (reporting that the Democrats "called it quits in what amounted to a
weighty game of political chicken"). Speaker Silver called the move a "sneak attack"
and said that "[t]here's only one word for all of it: shameful." Id. The fact that the
Democrat controlled Assembly folded so quickly reveals just how weak the tenant
lobby is at the state level.
147. Levy, supra note 10.
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limitation set on local governments to affect rent regulation laws. 148
Since the provision applies only to cities having a population of one
million or more, it applies only to New York City.149 Under this new
provision, "the City Council's power is limited to [i] extending, or
declining to extend, rent regulation, and [ii] amending the rent
regulatory statutes to deregulate particular classes of housing
accommodation. Any other kind of substantive amendment.., is no
longer permitted."'' 5
In addition, the new law makes clear that if the landlord provides a
"preferential rent," or one below the rent legally allowable, the
landlord may, upon renewal or vacancy, base any increase in rent on
the legally regulated rent, not the preferential rent. 5' For example, in
a Rent Stabilized apartment, a tenant could select a one-year lease at
a rent of $1,700 per month, and at the end of that year the landlord
would be entitled to the increase as determined by the Rent
Guidelines Board. If that increase were 4.5 percent, then the landlord
would be entitled to charge the tenant $1,776.50.152 If the landlord
instead keeps the rent at $1,700 per month, the new provision clarifies
that any renewal or vacancy increase allowable by regulation is added
to the legally allowable rent ($1,776.50) not the preferential rent
($1,700).153 This becomes especially important when, as here, the
$2,000 decontrol threshold is implicated. If the tenant moved out, and
the new tenant chooses a one-year lease, the landlord would be
entitled to a 17 percent vacancy allowance. 5 4 If the seventeen percent
were added to the preferential rent ($1,700), the new rent would be
only $1,989 per month. However, by basing this calculus on the
legally allowable rent ($1776.50), the new rent would exceed $2,000,
148. Estis & Turkel, supra note 6.
149. In fact, no other city even comes close. Buffalo, New York's second largest
city, has a population of just over 292,000. Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't, New
York State Statistical Yearbook 10 (28th ed. 2003).
150. Estis & Turkel, supra note 6.
151. Id. This applies not only to increases in rent upon lease renewal or vacancy,
but also to the $2,000 threshold for high rent vacancy decontrol and high rent high
income decontrol. Id.
152. Currently, the Rent Guidelines Board allows for a 4.5 percent increase for
one-year lease renewals, and a 7.5 percent increase for two-year lease renewals.
N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines Board, 2003 Apartment & Loft Order #35 (June 19, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 RGB Order], available at
http://www.housingnyc.com/guidelines/orders/order35.html.
153. 2003 N.Y. Laws 82, §3 (amending The Emergency Tenant Protection Act of
1974 by adding a new subdivision a-2, and section 6 (amending N.Y. Admin. Code §
26-511(c) by adding a new paragraph 14).
154. Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5-a) (Supp.
2003). The vacancy allowance is seventeen percent because under the statute, the
allowance is determined by subtracting the difference between the RGB's one- and
two-year renewal lease allowances from twenty percent. Id. Currently, the difference
is three percent, resulting in a seventeen percent increase. See 2003 RGB Order,




and the apartment could be permanently deregulated.'55 In addition,
the new law makes clear that the apartment is excluded from rent
regulation laws "regardless of whether the next tenant in occupancy
or any subsequent tenant in occupancy actually is charged or pays less
than two thousand dollars a month. 15
6
The history of rent regulation reveals that opponents have one goal:
permanent deregulation of all regulated units. While they have
seemingly abandoned the strategy of complete repeal advanced in
1997, the current attempts at deregulation are more clandestine. At
least there was a debate in 1997, however misguided. The 2003
extension resembled a poker game rather than a debate that could
conceivably affect the fortunes of over a million New York City
apartments.
B. The Current State of Rent Regulation Laws in New York City
In light of the complicated history of rent regulation in New York
City, the current state of the law may be difficult to ascertain. As
explained in the history of rent regulation, New York City operates
under the parallel systems of rent control and rent stabilization. 57
Furthermore, the history reveals that both types of rent regulation
must be enabled at the state level, and promulgated at the local
level. 58 While both rent control and stabilization share common
elements, the differences are significant, making a separate overview
helpful.
1. Rent Control in New York City
The New York state legislature allows New York City to
promulgate local rent control through the Local Emergency Housing
Rent Control Act.'59 The DHCR is in charge of administering rent
control in New York City,"6° as well as promulgating rent and eviction
regulations. 6'
155. 2003 N.Y. Laws 82, §§ 3, 6. This change in the law is a codification of
Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. DHCR, 724 N.Y.S.2d 742 (App. Div. 2001),
which overruled the existing DHCR practice of using the preferential rent as the basis
for all future increases.
156, 2003 N.Y. Laws 82, §§ 2, 5, 6-a.
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§
8601-8617 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004) (enabling New York City rent control);
Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974, N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8621-8634
(McKinney Supp. 2004) (enabling New York City rent stabilization).
159. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8601-8617.
160. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-404 (Supp. 2003). The statute defines "city rent
agency" as the state DHCR. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403(b) (1992). This anomaly is
a remnant of local administrative control before the state consolidation under the
Omnibus Housing Act of 1983. See supra Part I.A.7.
161. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, §§ 2200-2211 (2003). The New York City
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In general, rent controlled apartments must be in buildings of three
or more units constructed on or before February 1, 1947,162 and
tenants must have occupied their apartment continuously since at
least July 1, 1971.163 The number of rent control units in New York is
constantly decreasing, as no new units may be added to the system.164
Under rent control, the maximum rent is determined by statute,
through the Maximum Base Rent formula. 165 This formula allows a
landlord to increase monthly rent charges in order to recoup the costs
of owning the building.1" In addition, hardship increases may be
allowed in specific circumstances, including when there is substantial
rehabilitation to the building, and to recover the cost of major capital
improvements. 167
Rent and Eviction Regulations are in many instances identical to the language found
in the city's administrative code, which in turn closely models the state enabling
statute. This redundancy occurs because the city's rent laws must fall within the limits
of the state enabling statute, and the city must renew its rent regulation code
independently of the state enabling statute. Once the city renews, the state DHCR
promulgates regulations according to the mandates of the city's administrative code.
As the nearly identical text evidences, the administrative code (and thus the
regulations) generally reach as far as the state enabling statutes allow. See New York
Landlord-Tenant Law: 2004 Tanbook 433-34 (2003).
162. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403(e)(2)(h).
163. Id. § 26-403(e)(2)(i)(9). There are many classes of housing accommodations
specifically exempt from rent control, including most owner occupied units and those
owned by the federal, state, or city government. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9,
§ 2200.2(f)(11) (exempting owner occupied units rented after April 1, 1953),
2200.2(f)(6) (exempting government owned units). For a complete list of exempt
housing accommodations, see id. § 2200.2(f).
164. 3A N.Y. Practice Guide: Real Estate § 26.02(l)(a) (2003). The number of rent
controlled units in New York City currently stands at under 60,000 units. 2003
Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 107. For perspective, this number is down from over
1.2 million in 1970, and 102,000 in 1993. Keating, supra note 36, at 158. In limited
circumstances, a family member may succeed the rent controlled tenant of record.
First, the succeeding tenant must be a family member as defined by the statute. N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d)(3) (defining family member as the tenant's
spouse, child, step-child, parent, step-parent, sibling, grandparent, grandchild, parent-
in-law, or child-in-law, or "any other person in the housing accommodation as a
primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and
interdependence between such person and the tenant"). Second, the family member
must reside in the apartment, as their primary residence, for a period of no less than
two consecutive years (one year if the tenant is a senior citizen or is disabled)
immediately preceding the death or vacating of the apartment by the original tenant.
Id. § 2204.6(d)(1). This succession right is limited to one generation, after which the
landlord is entitled to significant vacancy increases. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403.2
(Supp. 2003) (referring to "each second subsequent succession").
165. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2201.4.
166. Id. The Maximum Base Rent formula is incredibly complex. First, a
Maximum Gross Building Rental ("MGBR"), taking into account expenses such as:
real estate taxes; water and sewer charges; operating and maintenance expenses;
vacancy and collection losses (capped at one percent of the MGBR); and return on
capital. Id. § 2201.4(b)(1)-(5). Then, the MGBR is apportioned among all housing
units in the building, according to such factors as how many rooms are in each unit,
and on which floor the apartment is located. Id. § 2201.4(e)(1), (3).
167. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2202.4(b)-(c). There are many more
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Rent control also provides significant protection against eviction . 68
However, there are specific cases where a rent controlled tenant may
be evicted. These include where a tenant willfully violates an
obligation of tenancy, commits or allows nuisance, uses the unit for
illegal or immoral purposes, or (where such a lease exists) refuses to
renew a lease for a period of less than one year under the same terms
and conditions. 69
Subject to the succession provisions, 70 when a rent controlled
apartment becomes vacant, it is subject to rent stabilization, or, if it
does not meet the requirements of rent stabilization, it is deregulated
entirely. 7' In addition, a landlord may apply for deregulation if the
apartment's legal rent is $2,000 per month or more, and the tenant's
annual household income exceeds $175,000 for each of the two
previous years. 72 If the rent reaches the $2,000 per month level, the
landlord may require the tenant to submit an income certification
form, verifying the annual income level.1 73 Also, if a rent controlled
apartment becomes vacant, and the maximum legal rent exceeds
$2,000, instead of remaining regulated under rent stabilization, 74 the
unit is deregulated. 75
Finally, if the DHCR determines that a class of housing has a
vacancy rate of five percent or more, it is required by statute to
schedule for the "orderly decontrol" of that class of housing. 76
instances where a rent increase is allowed. For example, if the tenant is illegally
subletting the apartment, a rent increase may be granted. Id. § 2202.6. See id. §
2202.4-2202.13 for a complete list of grounds for an increase in rent.
168. Id. §§ 2204.1-2204.9.
169. Id. § 2204.2(a)(1), (2), (4), (5). The landlord may also evict when occupancy
of the apartment subjects the landlord to criminal or civil penalties, and when the
tenant refuses to allow the landlord access to make necessary repairs or
improvements. Id. § 2204.2(a)(2), (6).
170. See supra note 18.
171. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8605 (McKinney Supp. 2004) (subjecting housing
accommodations that become vacant after July 1, 1971 to the ETPA). One reason
that a rent controlled unit may not be subject to rent stabilization occurs when the
apartment in question is found in a building with more than two units (minimum for
rent control), but fewer than six units (minimum for rent stabilization). Compare
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403(2)(i)(4) (1992), with id. § 26-504(a).
172. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2211.1-2; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-
403.1(b) (Supp. 2003). The code defines income as the federal adjusted gross income
reported on the New York state income tax return. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
9, § 2211.1(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403.1(a).
173. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2211.2; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-
403.1(b).
174. See supra Part I.B.2.
175. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2211.3; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-
403(e)(2)(k) (Supp. 2003). This determination makes logical sense, because the
apartment would be eligible for deregulation under the rent stabilization system as
well. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.11(s).
176. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-414 (1992). The code requires that the decontrol
schedule take into account "preventing uncertainty, hardship and dislocation," and
requires that the DHCR hold a public hearing. Id.
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Under these deregulation measures, the stock of rent controlled
apartments has rapidly decreased. 177 It is not difficult to foresee a
time when New York City returns to a single-tiered rent regulation
system. 17
2. Rent Stabilization in New York City
Rent stabilization is enabled at the state level by the Emergency
Tenant Protection Act of 1974.17' As with rent control, the state
DHCR administers rent stabilization, 180 promulgating regulations
known as the Rent Stabilization Code.181
Rent stabilization applies to buildings with six or more units built
between February 1, 1947, and January 1, 1974.182 Unlike rent control,
the relationship between landlord and tenant under rent stabilization
is governed by lease,183 and landlords are required to register all rent
stabilized units with the DHCR.1
As with rent control, high rent vacancy deregulation applies: if an
apartment's legal rent is at least $2,000 and the unit becomes vacant, it
is deregulated upon application by the landlord.1 8 1 In addition, the
landlord may also petition for deregulation if the tenant's annual
household income is more than $175,000, and the legal rent is
$2,000.186
In addition, New York State law provides tax abatements as
incentives for rehabilitation and construction of rental housing. 187 The
so-called J-51 program"' provides for local tax abatement when the
owner renovates or rehabilitates existing structures.189 The 421-a
177. See supra note 164.
178. Rent control was the sole form of rent regulation in New York City from 1942
to 1969. See supra Part I.A.2-3.
179. N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 8621-8634 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
180. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.50).
181. Id. §§ 2520-2531.
182. See id. § 2520.11 (referencing the Rent Stabilization Law, N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 26-504(a)(1), which sets the February 1, 1947 date); id. § 2520.11(e). Certain
classes of buildings are exempt. See, e.g., id. § 2520.11(a) (exempting units that are
subject to rent control), 2520.11(b) (exempting units owned by the federal, state, or
local government), 2520.11(g) (exempting transient hotels), 2520.110) (exempting
units used for charitable purposes).
183. 74A N.Y. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 413 (2003).
184. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-517(a) (1992).
185. Id. § 26-504.2. Note that this applies whether or not the landlord actually
charges the maximum legal rent. Id. § 26-504.2(a) (Supp. 2003); see also text
accompanying note 156.
186. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-504.1.
187. Id. § 11-243 to -244 (1996 & Supp. 2003) (covering rehabilitation); N.Y. Real
Prop. Tax Law § 421-a (McKinney Supp. 2004) (covering new construction).
188. The program covering rehabilitation under § 11-243 is known as the "J-51"
program, because it was originally codified as § J-51 of the city code. See N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.11(o) (2003).
189. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-243 to -244.
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program provides tax abatements for construction of new rental
housing.' 90 In return for these tax breaks, the owners of the buildings
agree to place the units under rent stabilization, including those units
that would not be independently eligible. 91  Since 1994, these
programs have added over 21,000 additional units to the rent
stabilization system. 1
92
Rent increases are handled quite differently under rent stabilization
than under rent control. First, the statute establishes a base rent,
upon which all future rent increases are based. 193 Once the base rent
is set, the RGB determines additional rent adjustments. 94 Under the
law, tenants have the choice of either a one- or two-year renewal
lease.' 95 Once a year, the RGB determines the percentage rent
increases allowed under each type of lease, and for each class of
housing. 96
Rent stabilization also allows for increases in rent to recoup
expenses for major capital improvements. 197  A major capital
improvement must benefit all tenants, unless the landlord can show
that a "similar component" did not require improvement in individual
apartments. 98 Once the rent adjustment has been approved by the
190. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 421-a. The 421-a program also requires that the
owners set aside at least 20% of the new units for low and moderate income housing.
See id. § 421-a(2)(a)(ii)(C)(b), (2)(a)(iii)(D)(b).
191. Id. § 421-a(2)(f); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 11-243(i)(1), 11-244(d)(ii). Both the
421-a and J-51 programs are incredibly complicated. The important factors of both
are that owners voluntarily agree to enter the rent stabilization system for the period
when they receive tax abatements. See 2002 Housing NYC, supra note 88, at 66-68,
69-70. These units are exempt from high rent vacancy deregulation, meaning that the
units must remain under rent stabilization even if the rent is over $2,000 and the unit
is vacant. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2520.11(r)(5)(i). In addition, both
programs are exempt from high-income, high rent decontrol as well, meaning even
where the rent is at least $2,000, and the tenants income is $175,000, the unit remains
under rent stabilization for as long as the owner receives the tax abatements. Id. §
2520.11(s)(2)(i).
192. 2003 Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 78.
193. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-512(b) (1993). Because of the vacancy
deregulations that occurred from 1971 to 1973, see supra Part I.A.4., this
determination can be quite complicated. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-512(b)(1)-(4)
(explaining the base rent for each possible outcome). The landlord or the tenant may
challenge the base rent. Id. § 26-513.
194. Id. § 26-510. The RGB comprises nine members, all appointed by the mayor:
two tenant representatives; two landlord representatives; and five public
representatives with at least five years experience in finance, economics, or housing.
Id. § 26-510(a).
195. Id. § 26-511(c)(4).
196. Id. § 26-510(b). For an example of the most recent guidelines, see 2003 RGB
Order, supra note 152. Once the RGB sets these guidelines, they may not be altered
or reestablished within a one-year period. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-510(i).
197. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(6)(b); see also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 9, § 2522.4 (2003).
198. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(2)(i)(c). rhe major capital
improvement must also be depreciable under the Internal Revenue Code, and be for
the "operation, preservation, and maintenance of the structure." Id. §
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DHCR, the total is divided among the total housing accommodations
based on their size.'99 This monthly rent increase is limited to 1/84 of
the cost, meaning that the owner could potentially recover the entire
amount after seven years.00
The landlord may also petition for rent increases when
improvements are made to individual apartments.20 1 However, this
provision requires the consent of the tenant while the unit is
occupied.0 2 When the unit becomes vacant, however, no such consent
is needed,203 and the landlord may make improvements and increase
the rent by 1/40th of the cost.2" This increase is permanent; it is not
rolled back after forty months.0 5
When an apartment becomes vacant (assuming its legal rent is
below $2,000), the landlord is entitled to rent increases beyond the
renewal lease increases determined by the RGB.2°6 These provisions
call for significant increases when an apartment becomes vacant, as
much as twenty percent for two-year leases.2 7 If no vacancy has
occurred within the last eight years, the landlord is entitled to a
vacancy bonus on top of the standard increase.20 8 Special low-rent
vacancy increases allow for additional increases where the legal rent is
below $500 per month.2 °9
2522.4(a)(2)(i)(a)-(b). Additionally, the item being replaced must have reached the
end of its useful life as defined by the regulations. See id. § 2522.4(a)(2)(i)(d).
199. Id. § 2522.4(a)(12).
200. Id. § 2522.4(a)(4). For each apartment, the maximum increase granted for a
major capital improvement is capped at six percent per year, an amount that can be
taken each year until the total amount is recovered. Id. § 2522.4(a)(8).
201. Id. § 2522.4(a)(1).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 2522.4(a)(4).
205. See 2003 Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 141.
206. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5-a) (Supp. 2003).
207. Id. For a one-year lease, the vacancy bonus is twenty percent of the previous
lease, minus the difference between the one- and two- year RGB renewal lease
guidelines for that year. Id. For example, a one-year vacancy lease in effect March 1,
2004 would garner a 17 percent vacancy bonus, because the difference between the
one- and two-year renewal guidelines is three percent. See 2003 RGB Order, supra
note 152.
208. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5-a). For example, if the apartment's
previous legal rent was $1,000 per month, and it had not been vacated for twenty
years, the resulting increase would be substantial. If the new tenant chose a two-year
lease, the standard twenty percent increase would apply, increasing the legal rent to
$1,200. The additional vacancy bonus is calculated by multiplying the number of
years since the last vacancy (twenty) by .6%. The result is twelve percent, making the
total vacancy increase thirty-two percent for a new rent of $1,320 per month. This
increase is in addition to the increases allowed for major capital improvements and
recoupable improvements made to the individual apartment.
209. Id. If the legal rent is less then $300, then the standard vacancy is increased by
$100, on top of all other increases allowed in this section. Id. If the rent is more than
$300, but less than $500, the total rent increase is augmented by a sum needed to
make the increase no less than $100. Id.; see also Michael Finnegan, Experts: Rent
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These provisions have allowed rent stabilized rents to increase
rapidly, and as an increasing number of apartments reach the $2,000
threshold, the total number of rent stabilized units continues to drop,
with some evidence that the pace is accelerating. 10 In trying to
understand how rent regulations became so politically vulnerable, it is
important first to understand what rent control is in terms of its costs
and benefits, and where those costs and benefits fall. Part II
undertakes this analysis.
II. ANALYZING RENT REGULATION
As the history of rent control portrays, the divisions between the
opposing sides are contentious and long-standing. There is a
fundamental difference between the opposing sides, existing at the
most basic level. Opponents of rent regulation believe that a housing
market unfettered by government regulations will provide the most
equitable outcome. Supporters of rent regulation, however, believe
that the market is incapable of protecting against certain outcomes
that society might deem undesirable.
Before looking to the core arguments, it is helpful to look at the
process of rent regulation itself. Specifically, breaking down rent
regulation into its constituent parts provides a framework of cost and
benefit that aids both sides of the argument.
A. A Tax-Subsidy Model of Rent Regulation
It is possible to recast rent control as a traditional government-
spending program. In essence, rent regulation can be seen as a tax on
landlords coupled with a matching subsidy to the tenant.21 For
example, imagine a rent regulated apartment with a rent of $800 per
month. Further imagine that the same apartment were to rent for
$1000 on the free housing market. The tax levied on the landlord is
the difference between the regulated rent and what the landlord could
have received in an unregulated market ($200).1 The subsidy is
exactly the same amount, representing the difference between what
the tenant pays under regulation, and what he would have to pay in an
Deal Slams Door on Poor, Daily News (New York), June 18, 1997, at 8 (displaying
how the low-rent vacancy allowances especially harm the poorest tenants).
210. See Barbanel, supra note 129 (reporting that because of current rent levels,
there is the potential for deregulation of over sixty percent of Manhattan's stabilized
apartments after potential vacancy and improvement increases).
211. The tax-subsidy model employed in this section is derived from a similar
model employed to analyze the minimum wage. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum
Wage, The Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev.
405, 411-417 (1997). As with Professor Shaviro's analysis, it is true that this recasting
of rent regulation is not an attempt to "capture[] [its] 'true' form," but rather, it acts
as a "clean separation of cost and benefit [that] is analytically useful." Id. at 415.
212. See id. at 414.
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unregulated market.213 In this triangular structure, the $200 moves
from the landlord, through the government, and to the tenant.214
If one assumes for the moment that there is nothing outside the
triangle, then the questions of who pays and who benefits are obvious:
the landlord pays and the tenant benefits.215 Even this oversimplified
model, however, raises important normative questions of equity and
efficiency.216 Should the landlord be paying the tax? Should all
tenants receive the subsidy? If not, what should the eligibility criteria
be? And finally, what exactly is the subsidy subsidizing?
These questions are further complicated when the self-imposed
limitations of the tax-subsidy model are relaxed. Under the model,
the landlord may pay the tax to the government, but there is a
likelihood that the landlord will attempt to shift this burden.217 This
shifting can be as simple as the landlord charging "key money" to the
tenant to make up the difference, but is often much more
complicated.2 8 In addition, the shifting of burden can potentially
affect parties outside the immediate landlord-tenant relationship.219
For example, the current rent regulation system benefits only those
tenants within the system. 220  If rents in the unregulated market
increase due to decreases in supply or reduced mobility, then some of
the burden of the tax shifts to those outside parties.2
213. Id.
214. See id. (describing the minimum wage as "identical, at first approximation, to
that which would have resulted had the government levied a... tax on the employer,
and paid a[n] [equal] subsidy to the employee").
215. This assumption is unrealistic by design, allowing for a starting point before
taking a more in-depth look into these two questions.
216. The twin goals of equity and efficiency are the cornerstone of the present
debate. See, e.g., supra note 19.
217. This analysis looks into the incidence of the tax. Incidence comes in two
types: nominal and real. Nominal incidence is defined as who actually pays out the
tax. When the bearer of the nominal incidence shifts the burden to another party, the
party that bears this cost is said to bear the real incidence of the tax. See, e.g., David F.
Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 135-36 (1986) (describing the difference
between nominal incidence and real incidence as "who pays the bills rather than who
actually bears the burden"); Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public
Finance in Theory and Practice 237 (5th ed. 1989) (using the terms statutory incidence
and economic incidence as analogous to nominal and real incidence, describing how
the shifting of the tax burden "may lead to a final distribution of the burden, or
economic incidence, which differs greatly from the initial distribution of liabilities or
statutory incidence").
218. Key money describes a situation where the landlord is only able to charge a
tenant a fixed rent, but adds an additional fee (which is not categorized as rent), such
as significant payment in order for the tenant to receive the key to the housing unit.
It is a clear example of the landlord shifting the burden of the "tax" to the tenant,
thereby placing the real incidence on the tenant. See infra note 266.
219. See infra text accompanying note 259.
220. Only approximately half of the tenants in New York live in rent regulated
apartments. See 2003 Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 106-07.
221. See infra text accompanying note 259. Professor Shaviro makes this argument
in the minimum wage analysis, where he argues that a minimum wage might be
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The question of who bears the real incidence of the rent regulation
tax naturally follows. Again, the true burden of the tax is more
complicated. Those tenants who are within regulated housing-the
"producer's cartel"-benefit from the subsidy it provides.222  This
benefit is most obvious under rent control, which does not allow
additional tenants to enter the system.2 3 Under Rent Stabilization,
there is also a producer's cartel created by the existence of high rent,
high income deregulation. 24  The earlier a rent regulated tenant
entered the apartment, the longer it will take to exceed the rent cap
where the tenant must prove an income below the statutory limit.22 It
is this rent "sweet spot" below $2,000 that could conceivably create a
situation where a wealthy movie star or television personality could
pay regulated rents.226 But this situation would most likely occur only
if the wealthy tenant resided in the apartment for many years.227
In the minimum wage analysis, the reduction of low-wage hours
available resulted in either a reduction in hours worked, or a
reduction in total jobs.228 In the rent regulation system, many argue
that the tax burden shifts to those tenants outside the system, where
accompanied by a reduction in total hours. Shaviro, supra note 211. He cites data
stating that "empirical consensus among economists [is] that a 10 percent minimum
wage increase would likely reduce low-wage hours worked by 1 to 3 percent." Id. at
416. This reduction in workable hours successfully shifts the tax from the employer to
the workers who cannot get a job because there are fewer work hours available, as
well as the workers within the system who have fewer hours to work. Id. Also,
"where full-time work plays so large a role," a reduction in hours available is likely to
translate into some currently employed workers losing their jobs. Id. at 417.
222. See supra note 220.
223. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (rent control); supra notes 185-
86 and accompanying text (rent stabilization).
225. For example, if a tenant rents at $1,200 and renews every two years at a six
percent increase, it will take eighteen years for the rent to reach the $2,000 threshold.
It is only at this point that the tenant is required to prove that their federal adjusted
gross income is below $175,000 in each of the two preceding years. Prior to the
regulated rent reaching $2,000, there is no inquiry into the income level of the tenant.
See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (rent control); supra note 186 and
accompanying text (rent stabilization).
226. John Tierney, At the Intersection of Supply and Demand, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1997, §6 (Magazine), at 38. However, most of the examples given in the article are
actually subject to decontrol or deregulation, as they rent for more than $2,000 a
month. For the sake of argument, if Alistair Cooke's federal AGI is less than
$175,000 (the cap was $250,000 at the time of the article), then under the law, there is
nothing illegal about him paying just over $2,000 for his luxury apartment. See id. The
article instead points to the problem of using income as a measure of ability to pay.
See infra note 235.
227. The problem is amplified if the tenant occupies a rent controlled apartment,
because while these units are subject to the same high rent, high income decontrol,
the initial rents were generally much lower and subsequent increases less than those
apartments under rent stabilization.
228. See supra note 221.
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housing is more expensive for a host of reasons.229 If landlords are
shifting the tax they pay on regulated units to those outside the rent
regulation system, then the regulation has artificially inflated prices in
the housing market. 230  This shifting of the tax burden from the
receiver of the subsidy to an outside party is at the heart of the
tax/subsidy analysis. The outside party could very well be those with
the least ability to absorb the artificial increase.
Compounding the problem is an almost complete lack of any means
testing for the recipients of the subsidy. As stated above, for any rent
regulated apartment renting for under $2,000, there is no restriction
on the wealth of the tenant receiving the subsidy.232 If Mia Farrow
had moved into her eleven room apartment a decade earlier, perhaps
the addition of high rent, high income decontrol in 1993 would not
have affected her apartment.23   Even where apartments reach the
$2,000 threshold, the definition of "high income" includes only those
with federal AGIs of over $175,000 for the two preceding years.234
Using federal AGI as a measure of wealth is burdened with the same
distortions and inaccuracies that accompany the Federal Income Tax
system. 235  Just as the teenager of wealthy parents can earn the
229. See infra Part II.B.1. for a detailed discussion of the argument that rent
regulation actually increases rents for most tenants.
230. For example, if a regulated apartment would garner an additional $100 in rent
in the unregulated market, many argue that landlords shift this cost to tenants in other
apartments.
231. Tierney, supra note 226. The author continues:
"The best way to help the poor is for society as a whole to provide aid
directly and insure more housing is built," says Anthony Downs, an
economist at the Brookings Institution who has published surveys of rent-
regulation research and is a prominent advocate of more low-income
housing. "Rent control is basically immoral and unjustified because it
imposes a social burden on landlords without providing much help for most
of the poor. It provides short-term benefits to the few, many of whom are
not poor at all, while creating immense long-term problems." Because
they're at the bottom of the housing ladder, the poor suffer the most when
rent regulation produces a shortage.
Id.
232. There is also no differentiation between apartments of different sizes, or those
in different neighborhoods. A three-bedroom apartment renting for $1,500 is
appreciably different from a one-bedroom renting for the same price. There are
obviously vast differences in similar apartments in different neighborhoods, especially
in a city like New York that has boroughs as different as Brooklyn and Staten Island
connected only by a single bridge.
233. Tierney, supra note 226. Mia Farrow's apartment overlooking Central Park
had fallen under rent regulation-she paid less than $2,300 per month. Id. This is
especially true in the case of a rent controlled apartment, for the reasons discussed
above. See supra note 227. Also, if a neighborhood undergoes a rapid increase in
rents, a few years can make an enormous difference in how long it may take for the
apartment to reach $2,000.
234. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-504.1, 26-504.3(b), 26-504.3(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2003).
235. See Ann L. Alsott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 571 (1995) (arguing that the definition
of income under the Internal Revenue Code "excludes certain fringe benefits,
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minimum wage, a tenant who has wealth but little income can
maintain residence in a rent regulated apartment.236
Empirical data confirms the fear that those who need the subsidies
most are not receiving them while those who may not need them as
much are. In the 2002 Housing and Vacancy Study, census figures
revealed that the median gross income for tenants in rent controlled
apartments was $20,120, significantly lower than $31,000, the median
income of all renters.237 In addition, the ratio of rent to gross income
was 27.3%, the highest among all rental categories.238 In 2002, 27% of
all rent controlled households paid more than 50% of their gross
incomes in rent, compared to 22.8% for all households. 239 The
implication is that the poorest rental households, conceivably those
most in need, are getting a smaller subsidy than those that are less
poor.24" This observation makes the incidence of the tax more
complicated. Not only is the tax being shifted from the landlord to the
tenant, but within the tenant group, poor tenants are paying a higher
portion of the tax than those with higher income levels.
There is also a problem of which apartments rent regulations legally
target. Rent control applies to buildings with three or more units,241
and rent stabilization applies to apartments in buildings with six or
more total units.242 The initial impetus for this limitation is unclear,
but the result is that a portion of rental housing has never been subject
to rent regulation exclusively because of the size of the building in
which it resides. 43 This complete lack of a targeted subsidy further
imputed income from property and services, interest on obligations of state and local
governments, and a significant portion of income from capital investments. In
addition, the income tax does not measure wealth and so cannot comprehensively
assess total economic resources" (citations omitted)).
236. Some (but not all) tenant organizations argue that the high income
measurement is a compromise meant to maintain the rent subsidy not for the current
tenant with an AGI just below $175,000, but for any future tenant who might not be
as wealthy. But this ignores the fact that the tenant could conceivably never pass on
the benefit to a needy tenant, and also that a wealthy tenant is receiving a subsidy that
could be targeted to those more in need.
237. 2003 Housing NYC, supra note 4, at 114-15.
238. Id. The median ratio among all renters was 26.4%. Id.
239. Id. at 117.
240. As discussed above, this inequity may have some basis in the rent increases
allowed under the 1997 Act, where landlords were allowed a vacancy increase of $100
for apartments legally renting for under $300. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-511(c)(5-a)
(Supp. 2003); see Finnegan, supra note 209 (citing a computer analysis by Michael
Schill, director of New York University School of Law's Center for Real Estate and
Urban Policy, that stated that "the proposed [19971 changes would 'redistribute'
income from poor tenants to higher-income renters.., because the poor tend to
move the most, seeking apartments that will cost more [due to vacancy bonuses for all
apartments renting for $300 or less]").
241. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-403(e)(2)(i)(4) (1992).
242. Id. § 26-504(a).
243. This problem is especially pressing in neighborhoods like Park Slope in
Brooklyn where there is a large number of brownstones with fewer than six multiple
dwellings. Unfortunately, most empirical data focuses on geographical areas that are
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undermines the stated goal of rent regulations in New York to provide
affordable housing.24
B. Claims of Destruction and Despair: The Rent Regulation
Arguments
The amount of ink spilled by opponents of rent regulation is
staggering.245 In response, the output of proponents of rent regulation
is also substantial. 246 The attack against rent regulation, at one time
too large. It would be interesting to compare two neighborhoods with similar
demographics, but differing in the number of units generally found in the housing
stock. By comparing similar neighborhoods, one predominantly regulated, the other
not, a study of this type could attempt to isolate the impacts of rent regulations.
244. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 2.
245. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Report to Congress On Rent
Control (Sept. 1991); Edgar 0. Olsen, NYC Rent Guidelines Board, The Impact of
Vacancy Decontrol in New York City: The First Estimates from the 1996 Housing
and Vacancy Survey (Nov. 1997); Pollakowski, Cambridge, supra note 17; Henry 0.
Pollakowski, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Who Really Benefits from
New York City's Rent Regulation System? (March 2003) thereinafter Pollakowski,
Who Really Benefits]; Salins & Mildner, supra note 19; William Tucker, How Rent
Control Drives Out Affordable Housing (May 21, 1997); Kaushik Basu & Patrick M.
Emerson, The Economics of Tenancy Rent Control, Econ. J. (Oct. 2000); Dirk W.
Early & Edgar 0. Olsen, Rent Control and Homelessness, 28 Regional Sci. and Urb.
Econ. 6, 797 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient
Regulation, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 741 (1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Rent Control]; Richard
A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1281
(1988) [hereinafter Epstein, Reply]; Peter D. Salins, Reflections on Rent Control and
the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 775 (1988); Robert L. Bartley,
Thinking Things Over, Wall St. J., May 19, 2003, at A17; Finnegan, supra note 209;
The Great Manhattan Rip-off, The Economist, June 7, 2003, at 25; Kristof, supra note
18; Steven Malanga, How Not to Solve New York's Housing Woes, City J., Autumn
2002, at 4; Henry Olsen, Rent Control's Costs, N.Y. Post, May 21, 2003, at 29; Peter D.
Salins, Rent Control's Last Gasp, City J., Winter 1997, at 1; Walter Block, Rent
Control, The Concise Encyclopedia of Econ. (David R. Henderson ed., 2002),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html; National Multi-
Housing Council, The High Cost of Rent Control (Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter High
Cost], available at http://www.nmhc.org/Content/ServeContent.cfm?
ContentltemlD=1186.
246. See, e.g., Office of Public Advocate Mark Green, Rent Destabilization Study
II: An Analysis of the Fairness to Landlords of Rent Increases Granted by the Rent
Guidelines Board for Stabilized Apartments (May 18, 1997) [hereinafter Rent Study];
Richard Arnott, Rent Control, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Econ. & the Law
305 (1998) [hereinafter Arnott, Rent Control]; Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism
on Rent Control?, J. of Econ. Persp., Winter 1995, at 1, 99 [hereinafter Arnott,
Revisionism]; Kenneth K. Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore a Free
Market?, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1231 (1989); Curtis J. Berger, Home is Where the Heart Is:
A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1239 (1989); John Cirace,
Housing Market Instability and Rent Stabilization, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1275 (1989);
Stephen Dobkin, Confiscating Reality: The Illusions of Controls in the Big Apple, 54
Brook. L. Rev. 1249 (1989); Gurian, supra note 20; W. Dennis Keating, Commentary
on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1223
(1989); Michael J, Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants?: A Reply to Epstein, 54
Brook. L. Rev. 1267 (1989); Samuel J. Himmelstein, Luxury Deregulation: A Boon
For Landlords, a Bane for Tenants, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at 51; Peter Marcuse,
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advanced primarily by economists and libertarians, has steadily gained
influence and favor among the mainstream press. 247 The arguments
are strikingly uniform, and cluster around claims that rent regulations
result in: reduced levels of new construction; 248 the deterioration of
existing housing;2 49 reduced property tax revenue;25° increased costs of
administration;25' reduced consumer mobility;22 and increased costs to
enter the housing market.2 3  It has even been reported that the
tension between landlord and tenant created by rent regulation led to
murder!25
4
Each claim underlies a basic belief that the regulation of rental
housing causes, rather than alleviates, the problem of affordable
housing in New York City. In this way, opponents of rent regulation
argue that they are fighting for the tenants of New York City as well
as the property owners.
1. Arguments Against Rent Regulations
One of the core claims of opponents of rent regulation is that such
regulations create a disincentive for new housing construction.2 5 The
claim is essentially that because landlords are unable to make as much
profit on their investment, they will not invest in new housing. This
"artificial" interference with basic market forces in turn lowers the
supply of rental housing stock, which in turn results in increased prices
for all rental housing.25 6 Harkening back to the rent regulation model,
this argument is an example of how a theoretical tax on landlords
(making it more expensive to build housing) is shifted to tenants in
increased rental housing prices. 7
Rent Control at 50, Still Stirs Controversy: The Defense, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1993, §
10, at 5; Jarrett, supra note 37; Jenny Laurie, Pataki's Poison Pill: Rent-Law Renewal
Retains Decontrol, Toughens Urstadt, Tenant/Inquilino, June-July 2003, at 6, 1; Peter
Dreier & Winton Pitcoff, I'm a Tenant and I Vote!: New Yorkers Find Victory in Rent
Struggle, Shelterforce Online (July/Aug. 1997), available at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/94/dreier.html; Reisig, supra note 37.
247. See Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
248. See, e.g., Kristof, supra note 18; Henry Olsen, supra note 245; Salins, supra
note 245; Tucker, supra note 245.
249. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 17-19, 30-31; Tucker, supra note 245.
250. High Cost, supra note 245.
251. Id.
252. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 28-30; Basu & Emerson, supra note 245, at
959; High Cost, supra note 245.
253. Block, supra note 245.
254. Jeffrey Toobin, Shotgun Eviction: Did New York's Rent Control Laws Drive a
Landlord to Murder?, New Yorker, Dec. 11, 2000, at 48.
255. High Cost, supra note 245 ("By forcing rents below the market price, rent
control reduces the profitability of rental housing, directing investment capital out of
the rental market and into other more profitable markets. Construction declines and
existing rental housing is converted to other uses."); see also Tucker, supra note 245.
256. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 28; Tucker, supra note 245.
257. See supra Part II.A.
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Opponents also argue that the housing shortages exacerbated by
rent regulation lead to a decrease in tenant mobility. They argue that
because "[t]he primary beneficiaries of rent [regulation] are those
consumers lucky enough to find themselves in a [regulated] unit,"
these tenants are reluctant "to part with the [rent] subsidy." 8 Under
this argument, the incidence of the tax on the landlord is shifted not to
the existing tenants, but tenants outside the system lacking the vested
benefits of rent regulations. 9
In addition, opponents argue that a reduction in the profitability of
rental housing "can lead to a drop in the quality.., of existing rental
stock ... [when] providers faced with declining revenues [are] forced
to substantially reduce maintenance and repair of existing housing. ' '26
They further argue that the burdens of the increased prices and poor-
quality housing fall primarily on the poorest tenants, and the benefits
accrue to wealthier tenants.2 6' In effect, opponents argue that the
poorest tenants are subsidizing upper- and middle-class tenants.262
They also claim that in a tight housing market, poor tenants are
competing with wealthier tenants for the same apartments.2 3 In
addition, poor tenants tend to move more than wealthier tenants,
resulting in more frequent vacancies occurring in the lowest income
housing.2 4
Additionally, when supply is constricted by the above factors, a
"gray-market" in rental housing develops. 65 A "gray-market" occurs
when the scarcity of rental housing forces new entrants into paying
significant entry costs. 266 Opponents of rent regulation contend that
258. High Cost, supra note 245 ("Consumers who would otherwise move to smaller
or larger homes or closer to their jobs do not do so because they do not want to lose
the subsidy."); see also This is Your City... This is Your City On Rent Control,
Newsday (New York), Apr. 13, 1997, at G1 ("Rent-controlled apartments are handed
down through families like heirlooms. People tend to hang onto them whether they
need the space or not."). See supra note 18 for a discussion of the often
misunderstood succession rights of rent-controlled tenants.
259. See supra Part II.A.
260. High Cost, supra note 245; see also Kristof, supra note 18.
261. Pollakowski, Who Really Benefits, supra note 245; see also Henry Olsen,
supra note 245.
262. Pollakowski, Who Really Benefits, supra note 245.
263. High Cost, supra note 245. Some opponents have argued that the reduction in
the supply of housing also leads to an increase in homelessness due to the overall
increase in prices caused by the excess demand. William Tucker, Where Do The
Homeless Come From?, Nat'l Rev., Sept. 25, 1987, at 32. But see Early & Olsen,
supra note 245, at 797 (finding that while rent control can increase homelessness
through reduced supply and increased prices, these effects are offset by other factors
that decrease homelessness).
264. Finnegan, supra note 209 (stating that "the poor tend to move the most,
seeking apartments that will cost more" due to a $100 charge allowed "for units that
previously rented for $300 or less").
265. High Cost, supra note 245.
266. Id. These costs can include finder's fees, bribes, or so-called "key money,"
requiring the tenant to pay a substantial fee to get a copy of the key. These costs are
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"[p]oor families, single consumers, and young people entering the
market are especially hard-hit by these costs." 267  This is another
example of how the incidence of the tax on the landlord is shifted to
multiple classes of tenants.
A final argument made is that devalued rental lowers municipal tax
revenues.268 Coupled with the administrative costs associated with
regulating rents, they argue that the rent regulation system burdens
state and local budgets. 269 Opponents contend that these costs are
significant and often "outweigh[] any short-term benefits of rent
regulation. "270
In these ways, opponents argue, rent regulation aggravates the very
problem it was designed to cure. Instead of providing more
affordable housing for those who need it, it protects the well-off
tenant at the expense of poor tenants and new entrants into the
market. 271' They insist that a return to an unregulated housing market
is the only solution to the current problem, 72 and that deregulation
will spawn a construction boom in rental housing, increasing supply,
and lowering prices at every price level.273 As noted scholar William
Tucker declared:
also increased by the "gray-market" practice of passing along vacant units to friends
and family members, further amplifying the shortage of housing. Id.
267. Id.; see also Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 10-15 (describing how rent
control helps the rich and not the poor, and precludes young professionals from
renting).
268. High Cost, supra note 245 (stating that reduction occurs "both in absolute
terms and relative to the increase in property values in unregulated markets").
269. Id. (listing administrative costs such as registering the property, collecting
detailed information, and providing systems for "determining rents and hearing
complaints and appeals").
270. Id.
271. Rent regulation opponents cite an array of studies in support of their
contentions. See Pollakowski, Who Really Benefits, supra note 245, at 13 (concluding
through the analysis of census data that "tenants in low- and moderate-income areas
receive little or no benefit from rent stabilization, while tenants in more affluent
locations are effectively subsidized for a substantial portion of their rent"); Tucker,
supra note 245 (comparing the price distribution of available rental units in cities with
regulations and without, and concluding that rent regulation, "meant to assist poorer
residents, harms far more citizens than it helps, benefits the better-off, and limits the
freedom of all citizens"); Basu & Emerson, supra note 245 (concluding from a
complicated economic model that the "[r]emoval of rent control laws can not only
increase efficiency in the rental market, but can also lead to a general lowering of
rents, making all tenants better off"). There are many more studies on rent control,
but the preceding is a sufficient sampling of the types found, and the conclusions
reached.
272. Tucker, supra note 245 ("The goal in getting rid of rent [regulation] should be
to allow the curve of housing prices to return to the elegant symmetry of the free
market."); see also Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 120-21; Bartely, supra note 245;
Henry Olsen, supra note 245. But see Basu & Emerson, supra note 245, at 959
(cautioning against using their model to conclude "that the optimal policy solution
[would be] to free the rental housing market of all government restrictions," as the
government must institute some "limits on the range of contracts allowed").
273. See Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 130 (describing a hypothetical future
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Rent control is a disease of the mind that soon becomes a disease of
the market. Those cities that resist infection-merely by having a
healthy tolerance for the rights of others-are rewarded with a
normal competitive housing market in which housing is available at
every price level. Those cities that succumb to the disease of rent
control are doomed to never-ending, house-to-house warfare over
an ever-diminishing supply of unaffordable housing. Public policy
creates its own rewards.274
It is clear from such dire pronouncements that the opponents of
rent regulation view the rent regulation battle as having only one
positive outcome: returning New York City's housing to the free
market. 75
2. Arguments in Favor of Rent Regulation
Proponents of rent regulation are quick to point out that the current
laws do not deter new rental housing construction.276
The problem with the proposition that rent regulation reduced new
construction was that it ignored the state of the law: the fact was
that all new construction had for years been exempt from any type
of rent regulation. Any developer was permitted to construct a new




housing market without regulation as providing "ease with which an apartment...
could be found,.., and the reasonableness of rents and prices"); Salins, supra note
245; Tucker, supra note 245. Opponents of rent regulation point to the recent
deregulation of rental housing in Massachusetts, specifically looking at Cambridge.
One study estimated that housing investment increased by twenty percent over what
could have been expected under rent regulation. Pollakowki, Cambridge, supra note
17, at 1. The report, analogizing the Cambridge housing market to New York City's,
concludes that a similar investment boom would occur in New York, leading to
"significant improvements in housing quality." Id. at 5; see also Bartley, supra note
245 (reporting that "Cambridge deregulation was followed by a boom in housing
investment" and that "pent-up housing demand is an 'ace in the hole' in reviving the
city"); Kristof, supra note 18 (reporting that after deregulation, "Cambridge enjoyed
a housing boom that improved the quality and availability of housing"); Henry Olsen,
supra note 245 ("[H]ousing investment in formerly rent-controlled buildings rose by
about 20 percent, [in] both high- and low-income neighborhoods.").
274. Tucker, supra note 245; see also Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 122
(concluding that "any discrepancy between natural and regulated rent creates serious
distortions in the housing market, and massive misallocations of the housing stock").
275. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 122 ("Let there be no mistaking it: the path
to a healthy housing market must involve the eventual end of the city's system of price
controls. We are not talking about revising or reforming[,] ... but rather their total
elimination, as well as strong legislative barriers to their reimposition.").
276. Mandel, supra note 246, at 1269-70.
277. Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 12, on file with author). Professor
Gurian also correctly points out that many private developers enter freely into ten to
twenty years of rent stabilization in exchange for tax subsidies. Id. (manuscript at 11-
12, on file with author). Under the 421-a Tax Incentive Program, the state granted




They also point to the fact that comparisons of "cities with rent
control to similar cities without it reveal comparable new rental
housing construction rates," a fact that undermines the opponents
claim that rent control causes less construction. 8
Proponents of rent regulation continue their attack on the very idea
that an increase in the supply of high-end apartments would filter
down, "whereby wealthy renters move up to newer and fancier
buildings, leaving the other apartments for the middle class and the
poor. '279 This argument assumes that there is sufficient room in New
York City for supply to increase to meet demand, a contention which
may or may not be true.8 ° In fact, one economist states that rent
regulations that allow for rent increases to meet operating costs "may
even increase the supply of rental housing." '281 The explanation is
simple. If rent regulation laws increase the price of housing in the
unregulated market (as opponents of rent regulation repeatedly
contend), then this should provide incentive towards investment in
new construction.282
Proponents also dispute the contention that rent regulation laws are
the source of decreased maintenance and increased abandonment.283
They point out that rent stabilization allows landlords to recoup
investments in the maintenance of their property through legal rent
increases.2 4 In addition, these rent increases are permanent, meaning
that they remain even after the landlord has been reimbursed for the
investment. 285 This system creates enormous incentives for landlords
to maintain and invest in their buildings.286  Empirical data also
278. Peter Dreier, The Case Against the Case Against Rent Regulation, Shelterforce
Online (July/Aug. 1997), available at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/94/dreier.html.
The article goes on to point out that "[t]he city's biggest.., housing boom occurred
from 1947 to 1966, when strict controls covered most existing apartments." Id.; see
also Keating, supra note 246, at 1229 ("Empirical evidence indicates that the level of
new construction does not necessarily vary between similar rent controlled and non-
rent controlled jurisdictions."); Mandel, supra note 246, at 1273 (stating that
"apartment construction in New Jersey cities without rent control dropped by 88
percent over the same period" where in New Jersey cities with rent control, the
decrease was only 52 percent, compared to a nationwide drop of 77 percent).
279. Dreier, supra note 278.
280. Mandel, supra note 246, at 1269.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1270 ("[C]ommon sense tells us that if the rents on new apartments go
up, there will be more incentives for builders to construct new apartments."). If this
expected increase in supply does not in fact result, that may be an indication that the
market has hit a supply ceiling.
283. See, e.g., Rent Study, supra note 246.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 193-209.
285. For example, a landlord can increase the rent by 1/40th the cost of any
approved capital improvement, but the increase does not expire after forty months,
even though the landlord has theoretically recouped the cost of the improvement.
286. The threshold for vacancy and luxury decontrol provides even more incentive
for building improvements, because landlords can shorten the time needed to reach a
legal rent of $2,000. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
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evidences that the abandonment of buildings "is concentrated in poor
neighborhoods-as it is in St. Louis, Cleveland, Detroit and other
cities that never had rent control. '287  This last point is important.
One of the primary criticisms of the anti-regulation attack is that it
assumes a causal relationship between rent regulation and negative
results when a host of other causes may exist. 288 As Professor Gurian
stated:
Among the questions that might have been asked about the
reduction in construction was the role of the federal government in
subsidizing suburban expansion while disinvesting in cities, the role
of massive out-migration of whites from New York... and the
impact of neighborhood change, the role of New York City's fiscal
crisis in the mid-1970s, and the rise in construction costs. [The
study] looked at none of these ...289
This is not to say that rent regulation proponents completely disavow
any relationship between regulations and construction, but rather they
acknowledge that the housing market is affected by many variables
other than rent regulations. 290  Anti-regulation attacks very rarely
make such a concession. 291
Not surprisingly, supporters of rent regulation dispute the
contention that a "free market" would produce the most equitable
outcome.292 They point to studies of their own that show that the
rental housing markets are not competitive, and thus would not
respond to increases in supply as some economists suggest. 293
287. Dreier, supra note 278.
288. For example, many commentators support their claim that rent regulations
lead to a reduction in new construction by pointing out that the number of buildings
constructed in New York City has declined over time. Salins, supra note 245.
289. Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 15, on file with author); see also Dreier,
supra note 278 and accompanying text. This point is further driven home when
looking to the data from the rent regulations of the 1920s, which show an incredible
increase in construction after the passage of the laws. See supra Part I.A.1.
290. Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 15, on file with author) (criticizing a
report for making such an assumption without answering the question of "whether
the reduction in construction was entirely caused by rent regulation, whether the
reduction merely coincided with stringent rent regulation, or whether the reduction
was partially caused by rent regulation").
291. This type of causal relationship is most often assumed with respect to
construction, but it is also found when discussing abandonment of buildings, Dreier,
supra note 278 and accompanying text, and homelessness, Early & Olsen, supra note
245, at 812 (concluding that while "rent control does increase homelessness [by
decreasing the rental vacancy rate,] ... these effects of rent control are more than
offset by other effects that decrease homelessness"). See also Arnott, Revisionism,
supra note 246, at 116 (pointing to other factors, such as increases in poverty,
homelessness, deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and substance abuse whose
effects on homelessness "are a quantum level more important").
292. Keating, supra note 246, at 1228-29.
293. See Richard P. Appelbaum & John I. Gilderbloom, Supply-Side Economics
and Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets Truly Competitive?, in Critical Perspectives
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Evidence suggests that Chicago-a city held up as an example of what
New York could be without rent regulation294 -suffers serious rental
housing shortages. 95
At the very least, proponents argue that there is conflicting
evidence over the causes of affordable housing that opponents tie
solely to rent regulation, and that it is far from certain that
deregulation would solve New York's housing problems. 96
on Housing 165 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986). After studying empirical data
from around the country, the authors concluded:
Counter to conventional economic expectations, rents are not found to be
lower in places that have experienced relatively favorable supply conditions.
On the contrary, vacancy rate is unrelated to rents, whereas rents are slightly
higher.., in places with a large percentage of their rental housing stock
recently constructed .... These results strongly suggest that policies simply
aimed at increasing the rental housing stock will not guarantee lower rents.
Id. at 175.
294. Epstein, Reply, supra note 245, at 1286 ("If the prices could move freely, then
we should quickly see the forms of competition found even in Chicago, where in slack
times tenants often get substantial concessions, including a free month's rent or
special repairs.").
295. Metropolitan Planning Counsel, For Rent: Housing Options in the Chicago
Region 47 (Nov. 1999) (concluding that Chicago's "rental inventory is shrinking, rent
increases are exceeding the consumer price index, and the overall market, as
measured by the 4.2 percent vacancy rate, is tight"), available at
http://www.metroplanning.org/cmaimages/RRMA.pdf. The report admits that in a
free market, constrained supply should lead to an increase in the housing stock. Id. at
33. It blames the failure of a market response on prohibitive zoning codes, high
property taxes, and high land costs. Id.
296. The reports about Cambridge, Massachusetts after deregulation exemplify this
dichotomy. Opponents point to Cambridge as an example of how deregulation is the
answer to ills of rent regulation. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Proponents of rent regulation point to the fact that rents in Cambridge have increased
significantly, and it is the poorest tenants that have been affected the most. Stephen
Gray, Committee for Cambridge Rent Control, A New Rent Control for Cambridge
(Spring 2003). One report identifies that a tenant would need an income of over
$73,000 to afford the median rent on a two bedroom apartment in Cambridge, which
is especially distressing when nearly two-thirds of residents earn less than $50,000. Id.
at 3. In addition, the report states that rents have not dropped during the current
economic downturn, and that the housing boom promised has not materialized. Id. at
5-6. In opposition, there is the Pollakowski study on Cambridge. Pollakowski,
Cambridge, supra note 17. Perhaps because it is so new, there is currently no
published criticism of the study. In that study, Pollakowski argued that investment in
housing increased by twenty percent, in neighborhoods of all income levels. Id. at 1.
What is not addressed is how this investment translates into rent levels for tenants. It
may be probable that investment improves the quality of rental housing. However,
the important question is: for whom? It is deceptive to imply that an increase in
investment in less affluent neighborhoods will benefit those tenants already residing
there. It is possible (even probable, given the documented rent increases) that the
benefits are going to new entrants into the neighborhood, or that poor tenants are
being forced to shoulder an even higher rent burden. See Gray, supra, at 4, 7 (showing
that forty percent of renters with household incomes in the lowest third pay over
seventy-five percent of their household income on rent, and that while Cambridge's
population is growing, the number of families is declining).
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR DEBATE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Part II of this Note presented the arguments for and against rent
regulation in light of a model simplifying rent regulation to a matching
tax and subsidy. Part III moves beyond the traditional debate and
proposes a solution that protects the neediest tenants while removing
disincentives toward real estate investment. Within the traditional
debate, opponents of rent regulation argue that regulations result in
fewer apartments, poor physical conditions, and that they ultimately
lead to higher rents, especially for the poorest tenants.297 On the other
hand, proponents of rent regulation argue that without it, middle and
lower income tenants would increasingly be priced out of the city,
resulting in a homogeneity that is inapposite to the very idea of what a
city is. 298
With such dire predictions coming from all fronts, it is no wonder
that politicians on both sides have been hesitant to strengthen the
existing laws. 299 These next eight years provide a pivotal time for
public dialogue that is critical to the future of not only New York City,
but the very idea of what a city should be.
Society must determine what it values. Rent regulation laws are
about more than just rents. They provide protections against
unilateral evictions,3 "° and they purport to provide affordable housing
and protect against displacement due to gentrification. 1 But in the
face of overwhelming criticism, the state legislature has consistently
weakened these laws.3"2 It is time for the tenant movement to stop
being so conservative, and to move the debate towards fundamental
reform that the press and the public can support.3 3
First, however, tenant advocates must admit that the laws as written
do not protect the poorest tenants, and are full of arbitrary
distinctions that provide ample ammunition for the dismantling of
rent regulations.30 " When the tenant movement takes this step, it can
begin to advocate for reform that will provide an alternative to the
297. See supra discussion Part II.B.1.
298. See supra discussion Part II.B.2.
299. See supra Parts I.A.8-10.
300. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
301. See Lisa Chamberlain, Exploding the Gentrification Myth: Columbia Profs
Surprising Findings, N.Y. Observer, Nov. 17, 2003, at 13. This article deals with a
Columbia University study's controversial findings that the belief that gentrification
forces low income tenants to move is a myth. Id. Interestingly, the study cites rent
regulation as being an important factor in protecting low-income residents from
market rent pressures. Id.
302. See generally supra Part I.A.
303. The cost of inaction is substantial, because the number of protected tenants is
shrinking rapidly. See Chen, supra note 25 (noting that 115,000 of Manhattan's
206,000 rent stabilized apartments rent for more than $1,000, placing them "within
reach of deregulation over the next several years").
304. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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free-market litany dominating the debate.3 °5 More importantly, if
proponents of rent regulation present regulation reforms aimed at
eliminating the inequities of the current laws, their opponents will no
longer occupy the moral high-ground they have usurped as defenders
of tenants.30 6 Most would be forced to reveal their true intentions:
that they do not believe in any tenant protections at all; that they have
no trepidation about economically homogenous communities (and the
racial and ethnic homogeneity that this homogeneity implies); and
that they believe that rental property is a commodity whose primary
purpose is to provide economic return to the landlord, not a home for
the tenant.3 7
Rent regulation opponents may argue convincingly that the current
laws produce inequitable outcomes-this is obvious.3 8 But they fail to
provide any normative evidence about whether a free-market housing
regime will provide the best outcome for what New York should be.
They believe in a "market theology, '' 3' and conclude that "the values
of the market trump[] all others."31 In other words rent regulation
opponents cannot guarantee that the housing market resulting from
market forces would be acceptable to New Yorkers.31" ' Laws could be
drafted that target only classes of tenants that society has determined
are deserving of rental subsidies.312 The current laws have hampered
tenant advocates for too long; it is time to move on and begin
advocating for regulations that actually protect tenants in need.
It is possible to protect tenants, while at the same time removing the
305. See Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
306. Id. (manuscript at 2-3, on file with author) (arguing that anti-regulation forces
adopted a "market populist" argument, specifically that the typical landlord was a
small owner struggling to make a profit, and the typical tenant was a wealthy exploiter
of the system").
307. See Epstein, Rent Control, supra note 245, at 772. Professor Epstein
favor[s] an open society in which persons must purchase what they want
from the owner of resources, and not plan and scheme to get the state to
operate on their behalf. The cant about communitarian ideals offers a
convenient cloak to allow the 'haves' to exclude those unlucky enough not to
have gotten there first.
Id.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
309. Gurian, supra note 20 (manuscript at 2, on file with author).
310. Id. (manuscript at 66, on file with author).
311. For example, even the most ardent opponents of rent regulation admit that
the current laws protect tenants in gentrifying neighborhoods from drastic spikes in
rent. See generally Pollakowski, Who Really Benefits, supra note 245. If New Yorkers
believe that New York neighborhoods should not share the economic segregation of
the surrounding suburbs, then even its opponents have shown that rent regulation is
an effective method of maintaining diversity. See Chamberlain, supra note 301
(discussing the results of a report showing that rent regulations are an important
factor in protecting tenants from displacement").
312. The question of who "needs" the subsidy is answered by a joint inquiry into
what society values (i.e., what types of tenants should be protected from market
forces and market failures) and a pragmatic inquiry into the cost of such a subsidy.
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disincentives that opponents claim are so damaging under the current
system.313 For example, the SCRIE program currently allows for rent
increase exemptions for senior citizens with matching tax abatements
for property owners.314 SCRIE provides an exemption of rent
increases in regulated apartments to tenants sixty-two years and older
who meet certain eligibility requirements.315 SCRIE is a perfect
example of a situation where society has determined that it places
value on a goal: protecting low-income elderly tenants from rent
increases.316 But the beauty of this program is that it provides a
matching tax abatement to the owner of the rental property.'
Consider the tax-subsidy model used to analyze the current rent
regulation system.31 8 Under SCRIE, instead of the tax being paid by
the landlord, there would no longer be a tax on the landlord, and
more importantly, the shifting of the burden that resulted from this
tax would no longer occur.319 Instead, the determination of the tax
burden would occur where it rightly belongs: in the state legislature. 32 °
The state legislature could decide that the goals of providing security
of tenancy and affordable rental housing should be borne equally by
all taxpayers. 3 1 The legislature could just as easily find that there
should be some targeting of this burden.322
313. See supra Part II.B.1.
314. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 26-509 (1992 & Supp. 2003), enabled by N.Y. Real
Prop. Tax Law § 467-b (McKinney Supp. 2004); see supra Part I.A.6.
315. Id. § 26-509(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
316. SCRIE's cost in forgone tax revenues was recently estimated at $76.7 million
annually, for approximately 44,000 households. On Redetermination of the Senior
Citizen Rent Increase Exemption in the Event of a Permanent Reduction in Income:
Hearings Before the City Council Committee on Aging, N.Y. City Council Comm. on
Aging (June 16, 2003) (testimony of Theresa J. Devine, Senior Economist), available
at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/SCRIEjune2003testi.pdf. A recent report
estimated that the cost to the city of increasing SCRIE's income threshold from
$20,000 to $24,000 would be $1.8 million annually. N.Y. City Council Committee On
Aging, Committee Report of the Human Services Division, 2003 Int. No. 539 (Oct. 20,
2003), available at http://www.council.nyc.ny.us/attachments/59116.htm. The bill
being debated eventually became a law on November 17, 2003, increasing the income
limit of SCIRE to $24,000 per year. 2003 Local Law 67 (New York City, Nov. 17,
2003).
317. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
318. See discussion supra Part II.A.
319. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
320. The problems of political representation-especially in a state like New York,
see, e.g., Kolbert, supra note 5,-while important for any discussion of change through
the political process, are far beyond the scope of this Note.
321. There are many costs like this-specific to a particular geographic region or
class of citizen-that society bears equally. Presumably, the achievement of such
goals betters society as a whole more than the cost incurred. For example, the SCRIE
program's cost is born by all taxpayers in the amount of forgone property taxes. The
benefit goes only to those poor, elderly residents who qualify for the program. The
question of whether such an incidence is equitable has been decided through the
legislative process.
322. For example, a shift to this system would provide a windfall to property
owners of regulated units because they paid a price commensurate with the rental
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A program like SCRIE could be expanded to include all tenants
who show need, both inside and outside what is currently deemed
"regulated. 3 23  There would, of course, have to be some practical
consideration of the maximum benefits allowed, but that is a political
consideration.3 24 Amazingly, this type of means-tested rent regulation
was suggested by economist Peter Salins, an outspoken opponent of
rent regulations.325 It was rejected out of hand as being too expensive
in terms of property revenues lost.3 26 This criticism ignores something
that rent regulation opponents have been preaching for years:
removing the disincentives to owners (i.e. lifting the tax) would result
in a market-induced housing boom.32 7 According to rent regulation
opponents, if we remove the disincentives for investing in rental
housing, then there should be an increase in supply followed by a
corresponding lowering of prices.328 In essence, this would move rent
regulation away from being "apartment based" and toward a "tenant
based" system. This shift would theoretically alleviate the perceived
problem of mobility that opponents of rent regulation contend leads
to gray-market dealings and side-payments.3 9
Some may argue that the administrative costs of such a system
would be exorbitant.330 However, the costs would conceivably be
offset by a variety of factors. First, rent regulation opponents claim
that rental property is currently undervalued, leading to significant
lost property taxes.3 In addition, opponents repeatedly state that
there are wealthy tenants enjoying the benefit of rent regulations.332
But the question of cost is one that should be tied to the inquiry into
income provided under the current system. If the government were to provide tax
abatement, the value of the property would rise to a level not contemplated in the
purchase price. The state could impose a one-time surcharge on these owners,
returning some of the windfall to the state in order to fund the cost of a targeted
regulation program.
323. This would include removing some of the arcane provisions of the current laws
such as applying only to buildings with more than six units. It could also institute a
sliding scale of benefits based on the size of the family and the size of the apartment.
324. Any need-based program will create a group of winners and losers, but it can
be assumed that such a class of tenants already exists (for example those living in
buildings with fewer than 6 units are already "losers" in the sense that they are
unprotected regardless of need). In the very least, a need-based program must be
built upon an equitable foundation where it is plain to all why those who receive the
benefit deserve it.
325. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 113.
326. Id.
327. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
328. Id.
329. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
330. Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 113.
331. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. Under the present laws, this could
mean a tenant whose household adjusted gross income is less than $175,000, but




societal values and goals. The current system is relatively easy to
administer, but that simplicity comes at a cost-a lack of accuracy
regarding who should get the benefits of the subsidy provided. If a
goal is valued by society, there is going to be an administrative cost.
The question is not whether these costs are unwanted per se, but
whether they are too costly in relation to the goals that they help
propagate.333 If society allows simplicity of administration to become
an end in and of itself, then society must be willing to accept the
outcome of the simple-to-administer free market, regardless of the
outcomes it produces.
In the resulting debate, tenant advocates would be in a position to
present a proposal that addresses all of the shortcomings of the
existing laws, and finally force the opponents to answer questions
about the potential outcomes of a free-market housing regime. For
years, most opponents of rent regulation have presented themselves
as protectors of tenants, in that they were working to provide an
increased housing supply, with lower prices for all.334 By proposing
regulations that rectify the inequities of rent regulation, the opponents
of rent regulation would have to show that an unregulated housing
market could provide the desired outcomes.335  Ultimately, the
opponents would have to show their hand, and reveal that they
believe in any outcome, so long as it is a result of market forces.336
At this stage in the process, the debate would finally focus on what
outcomes New Yorkers desire in a housing market. Tenant advocates
could argue for fair, targeted regulations, while the anti-regulation
forces could argue that the only fair outcome is determined by the
free market.37 Both sides will have to advocate to the public, arguing
that their proposal will provide the most desirable outcomes. Once
the debate reaches this point, whatever is decided will finally be the
product of informed public choice between equitable regulations and
a free-market housing regime.
333. Imagine a system where only three-bedroom apartments are regulated
because research shows that families generally live there. This system could be
administered very cheaply, but it probably would not provide the desired benefit of
assisting families that live in rental housing.
334. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
335. Chen, supra note 25.
336. See Salins & Mildner, supra note 19, at 130 (admitting that deregulation would
result in a "housing price structure that would make housing somewhat more
expensive for most New York households and a great deal more expensive in
particular market niches").
337. Id.; see also Epstein, Reply, supra note 245, at 773 ("There is simply no





The next eight years can be a time of tremendous promise for both
supporters and opponents of rent regulation. If both sides begin a
debate not over the inadequacies of the present laws, but on their
vision of what a city should be, a tremendous amount of progress is
possible. There is room to protect tenants from market uncertainties
while still correcting some of the most glaring inequities of the current
law. In turn, legislators must be willing to move beyond the political
dealings so starkly obvious in the 2003 renewal. The mantra
surrounding the rent regulation debate cannot remain: "Offer me
solutions, offer me alternatives and I decline. 338
338. R.E.M., supra note 1.
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